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Alternative Economic Indicators 
C. James Hueng 
Western Michigan University 
Policymakers and business practitioners are eager to gain access 
to reliable information on the state of the economy for timely deci-
sion making. Traditional economic indicators have been criticized 
for delayed reporting, out-of-date methodology, and neglecting some 
aspects of the economy. Recent advances in economic theory, econo-
metrics, and information technology have fueled research in building 
broader, more accurate, and higher-frequency economic indicators. The 
2018–2019 Werner Sichel Lecture Series invited six prominent econo-
mists to speak on their current research on alternative economic indica-
tors, including indicators in the financial market, indicators for busi-
ness cycles, and indicators of economic uncertainty. Their lectures have 
been compiled in this volume. 
In Chapter 2, William Barnett and Kun He argue that the growing 
complexity of financial instruments has made the traditional simple-sum 
monetary aggregates such as M1–M4 obsolete. The authors outline the 
evidence showing how the Fed’s simple-sum monetary aggregates have 
provided misleading information about the economy and monetary pol-
icy. In contrast, they show how their Divisia monetary aggregates have 
been more in line with the true liquidity conditions in the economy. 
Unlike the simple-sum aggregates, which assume that all monetary 
components contribute equally to the aggregate, the Divisia monetary 
aggregates weight the growth of each component using a formula based 
upon its user cost to reflect its liquidity in making transactions. Barnett 
and He describe the latest efforts in constructing the Divisia monetary 
aggregates by incorporating credit card services and distinguishing 
between the demand-side and the supply-side money services. 
In Chapter 3, Scott Brave introduces the National Financial Condi-
tions Index (NFCI) and Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index 
(ANFCI) as measures of the overall financial market condition pro-
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vided by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. The latter is adjusted 
for the state of the business cycle and the level of inflation. Since the 
global financial crisis, economists at the Chicago Fed have constructed 
composite indices that aim to measure the overall tightness of the U.S. 
financial system. The NFCI is a weekly summary statistic estimated 
by a mixed-frequency dynamic factor model on a panel of 105 weekly, 
monthly, and quarterly financial time series. In the chapter, Brave shows 
that the index aligns closely with the historical episodes of financial 
stress and has been a useful tool in monitoring financial stability. 
As to alternative business cycle indicators, numerous efforts have 
been devoted to replacing the traditional GDP measure. Many have 
adopted data-dimension reduction techniques such as principal compo-
nents analysis and dynamic factor analysis to extract as much informa-
tion from as many variables as efficiently as possible. Brave introduces 
the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI), a monthly summary 
statistic for U.S. economic growth estimated by principal components 
analysis using 85 monthly indicators. The CFNAI has been shown to be 
roughly 95 percent accurate historically in identifying U.S. recessions 
(as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research) since 1967. 
Based on a dynamic factor model, the New York Fed Staff Now-
cast is an early estimate of GDP growth for the current and subsequent 
quarters. In Chapter 4, Domenico Giannone and his coauthors, Patrick 
Adams, Eric Qian, Argia Sbordone, and Mihir Trivedi, present in detail 
this automated platform for monitoring U.S. macroeconomic condi-
tions in real time. This nowcasting model synthesizes a large number of 
variables (macroeconomic big data) monitored by economists, incorpo-
rating new information within minutes of the data releases. It is entirely 
automated and mimics best practices without relying on any subjec-
tive judgment. This platform provides a model-based counterpart to the 
analysis traditionally based on expert knowledge. The authors show 
that the New York Fed Staff Nowcast provided accurate early estimates 
of the U.S. GDP during the Great Recession. 
In Chapter 5, Alessandro Barbarino and Chiara Scotti provided an 
estimate of the probability of a recession occurring in 2019 by com-
paring various models and employing a mix of macroeconomic and 
financial indicators, including the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti (ADS) real 
business condition index and Scotti’s surprise and uncertainty indexes, 
explained below. The ADS index, maintained and updated by the Phila-
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delphia Fed, is derived from a dynamic factor model as well. It is a daily 
index that measures the latent real business conditions in real time, 
emphasizing that a business cycle is about the dynamics and interac-
tions of many economic indicators from various frequencies. The sur-
prise and uncertainty indexes are daily measures of surprises and uncer-
tainty about the U.S. real activity, as measured by the ADS index. Scotti 
and Barbarino conclude that real variables are more powerful in signal-
ing recessions at shorter horizons, while financial variables are valuable 
leading indicators at longer horizons. Their model, using real variables, 
did not show a high recession probability in 2019 (as of mid-March of 
that year), contrary to what was suggested by the Congressional Budget 
Office and several published surveys. 
In addition to Scotti’s index of uncertainty about the real activ-
ity, the following chapter presents another index for uncertainty—the 
economic policy uncertainty index. In Chapter 6, Steven Davis details 
the construction of the index and highlights the effect of the shift in 
U.S. trade policy under the Trump administration on economic uncer-
tainty. The index is constructed from newspaper coverage of policy-
related economic uncertainty by using computer-automated newspaper 
searches. Davis shows that the U.S.-China conflict over trade and com-
mercial policies has become a major source not only of economic pol-
icy uncertainty but also of increased equity market volatility. The trade 
conflict, however, has a limited impact on U.S. domestic investment. 
Conversely, the Chinese economy is more vulnerable to trade policy 
shocks and uncertainty. 
In the past decade, thanks to revolutions in computer science, engi-
neering, and geography, data compiled by sensors on satellites have 
become publicly accessible for researchers. The satellite night lights 
data have been increasingly used by social scientists as an alternative 
measure of economic activity. In the book’s final chapter, Adam Sto-
reygard highlights six key advantages of using satellite data for eco-
nomic research and policymaking. These include 1) providing data for 
data-poor contexts, 2) high spatial resolution, 3) low-cost repeat mea-
surements, 4) data available for the whole world, 5) consistency across 
borders of different systems, and 6) avoiding possible data manipula-
tions by traditional data collectors. Storeygard provides examples of 
research on deforestation, pollution, urban growth, transportation, and 




administrative or survey data, the satellite night lights technology holds 
great promise as the cost of obtaining these data goes down and the 
algorithms for analyzing them keep advancing. 
All the economic indicators presented in the lecture series are pub-
licly available. They are so well accepted that researchers around the 
world have been adopting the presented ideas and methodologies to 
build comparable indicators for many countries. Looking ahead, we 
expect emerging technologies in big data platforms and artificial intelli-
gence to further advance the research in how data are collected and ana-
lyzed, which should lead to more innovative and informative economic 








Getting It Wrong 
How Faulty Monetary Statistics Undermine 
the Fed, the Financial System, and the Economy 
William A. Barnett
University of Kansas and Center for Financial Stability
Kun He
University of Kansas
Barnett (2012) documented the degree to which faulty monetary sta-
tistics have tended to undermine the Federal Reserve System (the Fed), 
the financial system, and the economy. That MIT Press book, which 
brings together nearly a half century of research on that subject, won 
a Professional and Scholarly Excellence (PROSE) Award for the best 
book published in economics during 2012, presented by the Association 
of American Publishers. The research in the book is primarily based 
on the use of the Divisia monetary aggregates, originated by Barnett
(1980) and made available to the public by the Center for Financial 
Stability (CFS) in New York City. But newer, more sophisticated mon-
etary aggregates are now available from the CFS. The new aggregates 
incorporate credit card services into the Divisia monetary aggregates, 
and they distinguish between the demand-side total monetary services 
consumed and the supply-side inside-money services associated with 
value added in financial intermediation. This chapter begins the process 
of updating Barnett (2012) to use the newer data, but with the need for 
more sophisticated econometric tests in the frequency domain. 
Supply-side inside-money aggregates and demand-side total mon-
etary aggregates are not equal, since total demand-side monetary aggre-
gates include outside money not produced as outputs of private financial 
intermediaries. As economic indicators, they may perform differently 
in the short run and in the long run. Divisia monetary aggregates, on 
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the demand side or supply side, can be expected to perform even bet-
ter when credit-card transaction services are taken into account. In this 
chapter, we empirically compare credit card–augmented inside-money 
supply-side Divisia aggregates and total-money demand-side Divisia 
aggregates. In particular, we compare their correlations with major 
economic policy targets in the short term and long term. To acquire 
dynamic performances for time-series data at different frequencies, we 
transform their time series into the frequency domain using spectral 
analysis methods. Spectral coherence between the Divisia indexes and 
major final targets of policy at different frequencies can provide evi-
dence of the role of inside-money supply-side Divisia and total-money 
demand-side Divisia in the short run and long run. 
The original Divisia monetary aggregates measure demand-side 
monetary services using the economic aggregation and index number 
theory developed by Barnett (1980). The data are available from the 
Center for Financial Stability (CFS) in New York City. On the demand 
side, there is no reason to differentiate among inside money, outside 
money, regulated services, or shadow banking services. Demanders 
consume liquidity services supplied by all relevant sources. On the sup-
ply side, the manner in which the monetary services are produced is 
highly relevant to the transmission mechanism of monetary policy and 
to the indicator value of the resulting service flows. 
On the supply side, traditionally, outside money has been measured 
as the monetary base, supplied by the Federal Reserve as the sum of 
currency and bank reserves. Inside money has been calculated as the 
difference between the total-money supply, measured as a simple sum, 
and outside money. In recent years, that measure of inside money has 
become conspicuously defective, with M1 inside money often being 
negative, despite the fact that most of the monetary services in the econ-
omy are now produced by private banks as value added in banking and, 
hence, properly representing inside money. 
In recent decades, transaction and liquidity services have been aug-
mented dramatically by the growth of privately supplied unregulated 
monetary services from bank-supplied credit cards and from the ser-
vices provided by unregulated shadow banking. We consider inside 
money using aggregation and index number theory, not simple-sum 
accounting, and we augment our aggregates with credit-card service 
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on the supply side, total monetary services on the demand side, and final 
targets of policy can differ at different frequencies, since the transmis-
sion mechanism behaves differently in the short run from the long run. 
Exploring those extensions of Barnett (2012) would best be done 
using harmonic analysis. As a first step in that direction, we investi-
gate the properties of the data in the frequency domain using spectral 
analysis. But that approach, while being the appropriate first step in 
the intended direction, requires stationary data, which lose relevant 
information about the dynamics of the economy and of the monetary 
transmission mechanism. In addition, that approach is heavily sample-
size dependent. In subsequent research, we plan to extend this approach 
to the time-frequency domain using wavelets, in accordance with the 
approach in Barnett, Ftiti, and Jawadi (2019). This chapter contains our 
first steps in that direction. 
CREDIT CARD–AUGMENTED DIVISIA 
Using accounting conventions, credit cards cannot be aggregated 
with monetary assets, since monetary assets are assets and credit-card 
balances are liabilities. Accounting conventions do not permit adding 
liabilities to assets. But aggregation and index number theory aggre-
gate over service flows, regardless of whether produced by assets or 
liabilities. As shown by Barnett and Su (2020), services of credit cards 
and of monetary assets can be aggregated using aggregation and index 
number theory. 
These are the definitions of variables used in Barnett and Su’s 
(2020) model: 
Rt = expected yield on the benchmark asset, representing the rate of 
return on pure capital; 
μt = vector of real balances, μit , of monetary asset deposit-account type 
i during period t; 
τt = vector of real expenditure volumes, τjt , with credit-card type j for 
transactions during period t; 
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et = vector of expected interest rates, eit , on τt ; 
ςt = vector of rotating real balances, ς jt , in credit-card type j during 
period t from transactions in previous periods; 
ēt = vector of expected interest rates on ςt ; 
ct = real balances of excess reserves held by the intermediary during 
period t; 
Lt = vector of labor quantities receiving expected wage rates, ωt , during 
period t ; 
zt = quantities of other factors of production; 
ct = price of the factor zt ; 
kt = reserve requirements, where kit is the reserve requirement appli-
cable to μit , and 0 ≤ kit ≤ 1 for all I; 
Rdt = Federal Reserve expected discount rate;
 _ 
Rt = min{Rt , Rt
d } ; 
γt = vector of expected yields paid by the firm on it ; and 
p*t = true cost of living index, used to deflate nominal balances to real 
balances. 
The vector γt is defined so that the nominal user-cost price for produced 
monetary asset it is
(1− k R) − ρ* it t itγ = p .it t 1+ Rt 
The vector π is defined so that the nominal expected user-cost price 
for produced credit card services, τjt , is 
e − R* jt tπ jt = pt .1+ Rt 
The vector σt is defined so that the nominal expected user-cost price 
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e jt − Rσ jt = pt 
* t . 
1+ Rt 
The nominal expected user-cost price of excess reserves, ct , is 
γ = p * Rt .0t t 1+ Rt 
The corresponding expected real user costs are 
γ π σ γt t t 0t 
* , * , * , and * .pt pt pt pt 
Based on the aggregator function existence assumption of technol-
ogy weakly separable in produced monetary asset service, the Divisia 
money index for produced inside-money services is acquired by solving 
the financial intermediary’s decision problem. The result is 
*s *s * * * *log Mt − log Mt −1 =∑ sit (log µit − log µ , 1) +∑µ jt (logτ jt − logτ j t  − ) ,i t  − , 1  
i i 
where M*t = the economic output quantity aggregate for financial firms.
Here, s = (sit + s , 1  , with sit and ujt computed fromit 
1 
i t − )2 
* * *' sit = µ γit it / (μ γt t + γt πt ) , and ujt is the solution to the constrained rev-
enue maximizing problem: 
*' *' *Max μt γt + γt πt  subject to f ( μ τ kt , ,t t ) = Mt . 
Unlike conventional accounting inside money, the CFS credit card– 
augmented Divisia inside-money aggregates correlate very well with 
nominal GDP and can serve the central purposes of inside money, long 
contemplated in the literature on monetary economics. Further knowl-
edge of its properties remains to be discovered and explored in the fre-
quency domain. 
The primary differences between the supply-side measure and the 
CFS demand-side Divisia monetary aggregates is the supply side’s 
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Another difference between the demand-side and the supply-side 
user-cost formulas for monetary asset services results from the exis-
tence of reserve requirements, producing an implicit tax on banks. But 
in recent years, that tax has been nearly zero because of sweeps, low 
interest rates, and Federal Reserve payment of interest on reserves. 
In this chapter, we begin our empirical exploration of the inside-
money and total credit card–augmented Divisia for broad M4 and nar-
row M1, beginning from July 2007. Moving from DM1 (Divisia Ma) 
to the higher levels of aggregation incorporates increasing amounts of 
shadow banking and negotiable money-market security liquidity ser-
vices, properly weighted. 
SPECTRAL ANALYSIS THEORY 
For a finite series u( j) of length T = NΔt, here with N referring to 
the sample size and Δt referring to the sampling periodicity, the discrete 
Fourier transform (DFT) U(k) of u( j) and its inverse (IDFT) for finite 
series (see, e.g., Iacobucci [2005]) are 
1 N −1 −i 2π jk / NU (k ) = u ( )j e
N ∑ j=0 
and 
 1 /2( N − )  i2π jk / Nu ( )j =∑ U (k e) ,k =−[N /2] 
kwhere uk = is the frequency and T = NΔt is the time. In our powerN tD 
spectrum for real data in later parts of the paper, the label for frequency 
domain is vk , and the period should be 1/vk . The power spectrum is 
given by 
Pu(k) = |U(k)|2 .
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( ) ( ) ( )
1 
1 
2 cos N u uuJ N 




=−  −  
= ∆ ∑ ,
−1 N J−where γ uu ( J ) = γ uu (−J ) = N ∑ j=−( N J− ) (u j( ) − u  u j  J)( ( + ) − u ) is the
standard sample estimation at lag J of the autocovariance function. 
To build a spectral estimator, which is more stable—i.e., it has a 
smaller variance than Pu(k)—we turn to the technique of windowing. 
This technique is employed both in time and in frequency domain to 
smooth all abrupt variations and to minimize the spurious fluctuations 
generated in time as a series is truncated. The smoothed spectrum is 
given by 
N −1 2π Jk Ŝ (k ) = ∆t∑ ω ( J )γ ( J )cos ,u J =−( N −1) M uu N 
where the autocovariance function is weighted by the lag window ω( j) 
of width M. It can be shown that this is equivalent to splitting the series 
in N/M subseries of length M, computing their spectra, and taking their 
mean with the spectral window WM (k) of width M = M − 1. 
For two time series, u1( j) and u2( j), with cross covariance γ12(J) = 
γ12(−J) , the cross spectrum is 
N −1ˆ −i 2π Jk / N ˆ ˆS k  = ∆t ω J γ J e = C k − iQ k .12 ( ) ∑ J =−( N −1) ( ) 12 ( ) 12 ( ) 12 ( ) 
Here, the real part Ĉ12( j) is the cospectrum, and the imaginary part is 
ˆthe iQ12( j) quadrature spectrum. The coherency spectrum (correlation 
coefficient) is 
ˆ ˆ 2 ˆ 2S k C k( ) + Q k( )12 ( )  12 12ˆ ( ) =K k  = 12 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ . S k S k( ) ( )  ( ) ( )S k S k  1 1 1 1 
The phase spectrum (time lag) is 
Q̂ k( )ˆ 12Φ12 (k) = arctan(− ) ,Ĉ k12 ( )  
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which measures the phase difference between the frequency compo-
nents of the two series: 1) the number of leads (> 0) or 2) the number of 
lags (< 0) of u1( j) on u2( j). 
DATA 
Regarding the data sources, see Barnett and Su (2020). The credit 
card transaction services can be measured by the transaction volumes 
summed over four sources: Visa, Mastercard, American Express, and 
Discover. The credit-card-augmented Divisia aggregate does not apply 
to debit cards, nor to store cards, nor to charge cards not providing a line 
of credit. The model identifies credit card services as sources of value 
added in banking and therefore outputs of financial intermediation, 
since those credit card accounts provide deferred payment services. 
Cash and checking accounts do not provide that service. Debit cards 
do not, either. The services of debit cards are similar to the services of 
checking accounts, which are already included as services of demand 
deposit accounts but are not the source of value added we identify as 
credit card services. 
Store cards are not outputs of financial intermediation, since they 
are maintained by the stores that supply the purchased products. In 
addition, the connection between store cards and those products sold 
by the stores is inconsistent with the assumption of blockwise weak 
separability of financial services and consumer goods on the demand 
side, since these cards can be used only to purchase the goods sold by 
the store. Charge cards that do not provide a line of credit are rarely 
provided by banks, and they are now largely limited to store cards. 
SPECTRAL ANALYSIS RESULTS 
The year-over-year growth rate for credit card–augmented inside-
money and total-money Divisia are provided on the website of the 
Center of Financial Stability(CFS), dated from July 2007 to October 
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provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics; and the U.S. inflation rate, 
along with inflation rates internationally, is provided by statbureau.org 
from July 2007 to April 2018. The total sample size is N = 136, but 131 
for the inflation rate. 
All data are monthly data, corresponding to periodicity of Δt = one 
month. All time series data were detrended when spectrum estimated. 
Here we chose modified Daniell smoothers as the smoothing function, 
with moving averages giving half weight to the end values. The smooth 
width M = 8 determines the trade-off between bias and variance for a 
fixed sample size. The larger the value of M, the smaller the variance of 
the estimated spectrum at a given frequency, but the larger the bias. To 
get a smoothed estimated spectrum without losing excessive informa-
tion, we set M = 8. 
Since the original value of the year-over-year growth rate of Divi-
sia index is small, the power spectrum remains small after estimation. 
However, the periodic properties for coherence between inside-money 
Divisia and total-money Divisia, and with unemployment rate, inflation 
rate, and CPI index, are clear. 
In the plots below, we have sample size N = 136 with an 11-year 
time range, from 2007 to 2018. Frequency domain results, with the fre-
quency set at vk = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, correspond to periods of 1/vk 
= 10.0, 5.0, 3.3, 2.5, and 2.0 months, respectively. Although there is 
high correlation between inside-money and total-money Divisia, their 
behavior displayed differently at low frequencies over a long period. 
(See frequency of less than 0.1 with period exceeding 10 months.) Total 
demand-side money has a high coherency with the main economic 
indicators. 
In the plots for the broad M4 level aggregates, M4AI denotes the 
inside-money Divisia M4 augmented with credit card services. M4A
denotes the total Divisia M4 augmented by credit card services. Fig-
ure 2.1 displays the relationship between the total Divisia demand-
side aggregate and the supply-side inside-money Divisia aggregate. 
The first plot displays their power spectrum. The second plot provides 
the squared coherency, measuring correlation between the two aggre-
gates at different frequencies. The blue dashed lines above and below 
the coherency plot provide the 95 percent confidence band around the 
coherency plot. The third plot provides the phase spectrum and its con-
fidence region. 
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Figure 2.1  Inside DM4 (supply-side) and Total DM4 (demand-side) 
SOURCE: Center for Financial Stability. 
Figure 2.2 provides the analogous results relating the broad mon-
etary aggregates to the unemployment rate, while Figure 2.3 provides 
the results relating the monetary aggregates to the inflation rate and 
Figure 2.4 provides the results relating the aggregates to the CPI level 
at different frequencies. 
In Figures 2.5–2.8, we similarly consider the Divisia index for the 
narrow M1 aggregate. Moving from M4 to the lower levels of aggre-
gation incorporates decreasing amounts of shadow banking and nego-
tiable money-market security liquidity services. The periodic behavior 
differences become less significant. 
In Figure 2.9, we explore the relationship between unemployment 
and inflation and thereby the frequency properties of the Phillips curve. 
The cross correlation, ACF (auto-correlation function) in Figure 2.9, 
between the unemployment rate and inflation rate is displayed under 
different numbers of lag. Since the sampling periodicity is monthly, 
the correlation will be significantly positive only when the lag or lead 
Getting It Wrong  15 
Figure 2.2  DM4 and Unemployment Rate 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Center for Financial Stability. 
between the two indicators is more than 12 months. Also, there are 
phase differences under different frequencies or periods. As a result, 
it is not surprising that Divisia growth rates have different coherences 
with these two indicators. 
PREVIOUS RESULTS 
As this research advances, it will be relevant to compare with prior 
results that appeared in Barnett (2012) and Barnett and Chauvet (2011), 
but with the newer augmented aggregates now available from the CFS. 
Examples from the earlier research include the following figures. 
Figure 2.10 displays the broadest Divisia monetary aggregate avail-
able from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank over a period of 40 years. 
The figure clearly displays the aggregate’s correlation with the business 
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Figure 2.3  DM4 and Inflation Rate 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Center for Financial Stability. 
cycle and its predictive ability relative to the Great Recession, which 
began immediately after the end of that figure’s time period. 
Figure 2.11 displays M1 inside money computed in the conven-
tional manner as total-money supply minus outside money. The M1 
aggregate used in that computation is the Federal Reserve Board’s mea-
sure using simple sum aggregation without sweep adjustment. The only 
available measure of outside money provided by the Federal Reserve 
is the monetary base. In that figure, the monetary base was acquired 
from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s FRED database. Observe 
that inside money, by that measure, became negative during a period 
of time when most monetary services in the economy were provided 
as inside money by privately owned banks and other privately owned 
financial intermediaries. The error has two sources: 1) simple-sum M1 
is biased downward by the Federal Reserve’s failure to sweep adjust 
its component data, and 2) the Federal Reserve’s measure of the mon-
Getting It Wrong  17 
Figure 2.4  DM4 and CPI 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Center for Financial Stability. 
etary base has become an upwardly biased measure of outside money 
in recent years as a result of the Federal Reserve’s nonstandard policies. 
Figure 2.12 displays nonborrowed reserves as reported by the 
Federal Reserve Board. Nonborrowed reserves were the instrument 
of monetary policy adopted by Fed chairman Paul Volcker during the 
three-year period of the “monetarist experiment.” Observe the period 
during which nonborrowed reserves became negative. That result is a 
contradiction in terms, since borrowed reserves, by definition, cannot 
exceed total reserves. The Federal Reserve’s accounting error, produc-
ing that impossible result, occurs because it is including within bor-
rowed reserves some bank borrowing not held as reserves. 
Figure 2.13 displays the results of the Taylor rule, as provided by 
the St. Louis Fed’s FRED database. The figure shows the target range 
for the Taylor rule and the actual path of the federal funds rate. Clearly 
18 Barnett and He 
Figure 2.5  Inside DM1 (supply-side) and Total DM1 (demand-side) 
SOURCE: Center for Financial Stability. 
the federal funds rate was below the target range for three successive 
years, casting doubt on the policy relevance of the interest rate target. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we begin our research on updating the results in 
Barnett (2012) to use the more sophisticated Divisia monetary aggre-
gates recently available from the Center for Financial Stability. Those 
aggregates are extended to include credit card services and to distin-
guish demand-side total consumed monetary services from supply-side 
inside monetary services associated with value added in banking. Since 
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Figure 2.6  DM1 and Unemployment Rate 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Center for Financial Stability. 
the transmission mechanism has lags resulting in different correlations 
with final targets in the long run versus the short run, we introduce into 
this literature tests in the frequency domain. 
To acquire dynamic performances for time series data at different 
frequencies, we transform the time series into the frequency domain 
using spectral analysis methods. As the sample size becomes larger, 
more significant results will become available from data covering a 
complete business cycle. Although this approach is an appropriate first 
step in this direction, conversion to the frequency domain requires sta-
tionarity. However, such stationary data lose much relevant information 
about the economy. In subsequent research, we shall investigate nonsta-
tionary data with wavelet methodology in the time-frequency domain, 
following the approach of Barnett, Ftiti, and Jawadi (2019). 
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Figure 2.7  DM1 and Inflation Rate 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Center for Financial Stability. 
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Figure 2.8  DM1 and CPI 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Center for Financial Stability. 
22 Barnett and He 
Figure 2.9  Possible Explanation of Phillips Curve 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics and Center for Financial Stability. 
Figure 2.10  Year-over-Year Growth Rates of the Broadest Available 
Divisia Monetary Aggregate during 40 Years 
SOURCE: Barnett (2012). 
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Figure 2.11  M1 Inside Money, Computed as Federal Reserve Simple 
Sum M1 Minus St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank Monetary 
Base (outside money) 
SOURCE: St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s FRED Database. 
Figure 2.12  Nonborrowed Reserves 
SOURCE: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
24 Barnett and He 
Figure 2.13  Taylor Rule Federal Funds Rate 
 
SOURCE: St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank’s FRED Database. Reprinted from Barnett 
and Chauvet (2011). 
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A Closer Look at the Chicago 
Fed’s Activity Indexes 
Scott A. Brave 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
How does one go about summarizing the state of the U.S. econ-
omy? In the age of “big data,” this may seem like a strange question 
to ask, but it is no less relevant today than it was when the National 
Income and Product Accounts were first developed in the early twen-
tieth century. If anything, it may arguably be a more difficult question 
now than it was then, given the multitude of economic statistics pro-
duced by both government statistical agencies and private firms. While 
it remains common to characterize the health of the U.S. economy in 
terms of broad macroeconomic aggregates like gross domestic product 
(GDP), other measures are often used as well in order to capture the 
state of individual sectors of the economy or as potential indicators of 
the future direction of growth in GDP. 
With so many indicators available to economic and financial ana-
lysts, using them effectively becomes a question of how best to make 
use of their common strengths while minimizing their individual weak-
nesses. Activity indexes are designed for just such a purpose. As an 
example of what is referred to as a dense modeling approach in statistics 
(Giannone, Lenza, and Primiceri 2018), these indexes aim to extract as 
much information on the overall state of the U.S. economy as they can, 
and to do it as efficiently as possible, while using all of the available 
data. In principle, this approach acknowledges that all of the available 
indicators might be important for measuring the health of the U.S. econ-
omy, despite their own individual influence potentially being small. 
At the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (the Chicago Fed), we pro-
duce two types of activity indexes: 1) economic and 2) financial activ-
ity indexes. The former characterize business conditions in the U.S. 
economy at various levels of geographic detail, while the latter capture 
25 
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credit conditions in the financial sector, broadly considered. Both types 
of indexes are predicated on a common statistical framework—namely 
the Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) approximate factor model, as 
discussed in the next section. While their estimation methods vary, both 
types of indexes rely on popular data-dimension reduction techniques 
such as principal components and dynamic factor analysis (Stock and 
Watson 2011). 
As an example of each type of index, Figures 3.1 and 3.2 plot the 
recent histories for the Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) 
and the National Financial Conditions Index (NFCI), respectively. 
Based on the work of Stock and Watson (1999), the CFNAI was origi-
nally developed to help forecast inflation, but over time it has come 
to be viewed as a measure of the U.S. business cycle (Evans, Liu, and 
Pham-Kanter 2002). Positive values of the index are interpreted as rep-
resenting above-trend economic growth; negative values as represent-
ing below-trend growth. The index is shown in standard deviation units 
based on a history extending back to early 1967. The section titled “The 
CFNAI” chronicles the nearly 20-year history of the production of this 
index as well as its offshoots and recent extensions. 
The NFCI, in contrast, was developed more recently from research 
conducted during the global financial crisis. It aims at measuring the 
overall tightness of the U.S. financial system (Brave and Butters 2011). 
An increase in the NFCI implies an increase in risk or a decrease in 
credit growth or leverage in financial markets. Positive (negative) val-
ues denote tighter-than-average (looser-than-average) conditions in 
standard deviation units based on a history extending back to 1971. 
A separate index, the Adjusted National Financial Conditions Index 
(ANFCI), which rebenchmarks conditions relative to economic growth 
and inflation, is shown in Figure 3.2. The section titled “The NFCI” dis-
cusses some of the uses of the NFCI and ANFCI. Concluding remarks 
are offered in the final section. 
THE APPROXIMATE FACTOR MODEL 
The Chamberlain and Rothschild (1983) approximate factor model 
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to identify a small number of common components (i.e., factors, Ft ) 
explaining the comovement of large panels of macroeconomic or finan-
cial time series, Xit . A commonly used parameterization of this model 
is shown in Equation 3.1, 
(3.1) Xit = Γi Ft + ϵit 
ϵit  ~ N(0,σ 2I ) , 
where Γi are referred to as factor loadings for each time series i, and Eit 
represents the idiosyncratic variation in each time series that is uncor-
related with the factors. This framework can be used to capture, for 
example, sectors of the economy that vary together over the business 
cycle as well as financial markets that tend to tighten in concert over the 
financial cycle, with the single most important factor often serving as 
an economic or financial activity index, depending on the application. 
The challenge faced by practitioners in applying this framework to 
construct activity indexes is that the econometrician does not typically 
observe the factors. Instead, latent variable estimators that can extract 
Ft up to a scale/sign rotation must be applied to Xit . In other words, 
one has to extract from the panel of time series the common signal in 
Ft from the noise of Eit . It is this feature of these estimators that was 
alluded to in the introduction as maximizing the common strengths of 
various economic and financial indicators while simultaneously mini-
mizing their individual weaknesses in characterizing the state of the 
U.S. economy. 
A technique commonly used for this purpose is principal com-
ponents analysis (PCA). PCA can be viewed as a multidimensional 
restricted nonlinear least squares problem (Stock and Watson 2002a), 
e.g., 
N T˜˜  ° 
(3.2) min V (, F ) = (NT )−1 (Xit − iFt)2 s.t. = 1  . 
°,F N 
i=1 t=1 
Solving the error minimization problem above (in matrix form) for a 
single common factor produces an estimate of the activity index that is 
an intuitive optimally weighted average of large panels of time series. 
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tion of the economic or financial time series that maximizes their total 
variance explained. 
ˆN ˜X(3.3) Activity Index: F̂  = (˜)−1˜X ˜ = ;
N N 
Γ̂ ≡ eigenvector associated with largest eigenvalue of (X′X) . 
For large panels of time series, PCA produces consistent estimates of 
the factors under general conditions (Bai and Ng 2002), and given its 
computational ease, it has become a standard for estimating the approx-
imate factor model. 
By extending the analysis of the approximate factor model along 
the time dimension, some of the restrictions implied by PCA can be 
relaxed using an alternative estimation technique called dynamic factor 
analysis. An example is given below: 
Xit = iFt + it, 
Ft = –Ft−1 + t,(3.4)
it ˛ N (0, ƒ), Cov(it, jt) = 0  i = j, 
t ˛ N (0, 1), 
where we now specify autoregressive dynamics (in companion form) 
for a single factor and allow for heteroskedasticity in the idiosyncratic 
errors of the panel. 
Estimating the activity index in this case requires signal extrac-
tion methods for normal-linear state-space models that make use of the
Kalman filter and routines for maximum likelihood estimation (Durbin 
and Koopman 2012). While we lose some of the simplicity of interpre-
tation of the activity index by using this method versus PCA, we also 
gain the ability to directly forecast anything in the panel of time series. 
This feature has proven to be particularly attractive to researchers inter-
ested in forecasting the current state of the U.S. economy (Giannone, 
Reichlin, and Small 2008). Dynamic factor models can also be eas-
ily extended to handle common data irregularities, such as unbalanced 
panels and mixed frequencies of observation.1 
The treatment of mixed-frequency data sets, in particular, is a 
strength of the state-space methods used to estimate dynamic factor 
30 Brave 
models. For example, the practice of appending frequency-matching 
temporal aggregation constraints to the dynamic factor model (some-
times referred to as accumulators, as in Harvey [1989]) has been used 
to construct mixed-frequency indexes of both economic and financial 
activity for the United States (e.g., Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti 2009; 
Brave and Butters 2012b; Mariano and Murasawa 2003). While these 
extensions are not commonly found in standard statistical software 
packages, their use is becoming more widespread. For further informa-
tion, see Brave, Butters, and Kelley (2019), which describes the Matlab 
toolbox package MFSS. 
Recent research has also developed computationally efficient meth-
ods that make the estimation of dynamic factor models feasible for 
large panels of time series. These include quasi maximum likelihood 
routines such as expectation-maximization (EM) algorithms (Bańbura 
and Modugno 2014; Doz, Giannone, and Reichlin 2012) as well as col-
lapsing transformations that can simplify maximum likelihood estima-
tion. An example of the latter can be found in Bräuning and Koopman 
(2014). Referred to as collapsed dynamic factor analysis, their appli-
cation can be viewed as a hybrid case in which principal components 
are construed as observations of the latent factors up to the inclusion 
of classical measurement errors. The Chicago Fed’s activity indexes 
make use of both PCA and dynamic factor estimation methods. In the 
sections that follow, we describe these indexes and summarize some of 
their applications. 
THE CFNAI 
The Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) is a monthly 
summary statistic for U.S. economic growth. Estimated by PCA, it is the 
first principal component of 85 monthly indicators covering four broad 
categories of economic activity: 1) production and income; 2) employ-
ment, unemployment, and hours; 3) personal consumption and housing; 
and 4) sales, orders, and inventories. Many of the most commonly cited 
economic indicators for the United States fall within these categories, 
including industrial production, payroll employment, the unemployment 
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rate, personal consumption expenditures, housing starts, and manufac-
turing and trade sales. 
First introduced in Evans, Liu, and Pham-Kanter (2002), the CFNAI 
derived largely from earlier work examining the forecasting ability of 
real economic activity indicators for U.S. inflation (e.g., Fisher 2000; 
Stock and Watson 1999). Today, however, it is primarily seen as a 
coincident indicator of the U.S. business cycle, as this use of the index 
formed much of the motivation for its initial release at the onset of the 
2001 recession, as well as much of the subsequent work with the index 
during and after the 2007–2009 recession (e.g., Brave 2009; Brave and 
Lichtenstein 2012). 
The CFNAI’s performance in this regard has been quite good. For 
example, the index has been shown to be roughly 95 percent accurate 
historically in identifying U.S. recessions from expansions since 1967 
based on a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis of U.S. 
business cycles (Berge and Jordà 2011). This classification technique 
nonparametrically captures the trade-off between type I (false positive) 
and type II (false negative) errors based on the observed distribution of 
an indicator, Ct. To measure its accuracy for U.S. business cycles, the 
ROC curve is constructed over the range of realizations of Ct by apply-
ing the Cartesian convention {ROC(r), r}, in which ROC(r) = TP (c) 
and r = FP (c) and defining 
(3.5) TP (c) = P [Ct ≥ c|St = 1] ,
FP (c) = P [Ct ≥ c|St = 0] , 
where St is a binary variable, with St = 1 representing a U.S. reces-
sion and St = 0 representing an expansion. The area under the curve 
(AUC) then represents Ct’s accuracy in separating U.S. recessions from 
expansions. 
Figure 3.3 depicts AUC values (red connected dots) for the CFNAI 
and its three-month moving average (CFNAI-MA3) at leads (negative 
x-axis values) and lags (positive x-axis values) in months over the U.S. 
business cycle. The dashed red horizontal lines in each panel corre-
spond to the peak AUC value for each measure, while the gray bars are 
95 percent confidence intervals. An AUC value statistically significant 
from 0.5 reflects an indicator that exhibits a significant ability to appro-
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Figure 3.3  AUCs at Monthly Leads and Lags of the Business Cycle 
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SOURCE: Author’s calculations based on data available at www.chicagofed.org/cfnai. 
priately classify recessions and expansions as defined by the National 
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER).2 The closer an AUC value is to 
1, the more accurate the indicator. The closer an indicator’s peak AUC 
value is to a zero monthly lag, the more coincident it is with the cycle, 
so that a peak value to the left of zero signifies a leading indicator and 
a peak value to the right of zero signifies a lagging indicator. It is clear 
from Figure 3.3 that both the CFNAI and CFNAI-MA3 are highly accu-
rate coincident indicators of the U.S. business cycle, with peak AUCs 
of between 0.93 and 0.96 in the range of zero to one monthly lags. This 
result has also been borne out in practice, as the CFNAI led the NBER’s 
dating of the 2001 and 2007–2009 recessions by 6–18 months on aver-
age in real time, according to the rules of thumb for the index used to 
judge the beginning and end of recessions (Brave and Butters 2010). Its 
success as a business-cycle measure has also led to its use in various 
forecasting applications for U.S. real GDP growth (Brave and Butters 
2014), as well as the estimation of its trend (Brave and Butters 2013). 
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More recent work has expanded on the CFNAI by broadening the 
universe of data series and incorporating the latest advances in dynamic-
factor analytic methods. For instance, Brave, Butters, and Kelley (2019) 
use mixed-frequency collapsed dynamic-factor analysis to summa-
rize growth in 500 monthly real activity indicators and quarterly GDP
growth to arrive at a measure of monthly GDP growth for the United 
States that can be decomposed into trend, cycle, and irregular compo-
nents. The cycle component is then shown to be 99 percent accurate 
in capturing U.S. recessions and expansions and can be broken down 
further into leading and lagging elements that resemble the CFNAI and 
the Conference Board’s Leading Economic Index, respectively. 
The impressive résumé of the CFNAI has also spurred the develop-
ment of other indexes used to measure growth in economic activity at 
a regional level (e.g., the Midwest Economy Index, or MEI; see Brave 
and Lu [2010]) and a local level (e.g., the Detroit Economic Activity 
Index, or DEAI; see Brave and Traub [2017]).3 These indexes have 
been shown to be useful in filling gaps in our understanding of local 
economic conditions, given the longer publication delays and limited 
availability of data at state and local levels. For example, Brave and 
Wang (2011) used the MEI to predict gross state product growth in real 
time, and the DEAI was developed in order to measure the economic 
progress of Detroit after exiting bankruptcy. Summarizing annual, 
quarterly, and monthly data on city income, labor, real estate, and trade 
using mixed-frequency dynamic factor methods, the DEAI can also be 
used to estimate GDP for the city of Detroit as well as forecast its per 
capita income. 
THE NFCI 
The approximate factor model can also be applied to financial time 
series in order to capture periods of financial stress consistent with a 
financial cycle. Working with financial data, however, introduces addi-
tional complexities. For instance, financial time series are generally 
available at mixed and often higher frequencies of observation. Also, 
they tend to have richer correlation structures in which not all comove-




broader mix of procyclical and countercyclical indicators. Furthermore, 
if one is interested in isolating the state of financial markets from the 
state of the business cycle, adjustments must be made to either the data 
or the model to condition on this information. 
All of these concerns are addressed in one form or another in the 
construction of the Chicago Fed’s National Financial Conditions Index 
(NFCI). The NFCI is a weekly summary statistic for U.S. financial con-
ditions and is estimated by mixed-frequency dynamic-factor analysis 
on a panel of 105 weekly, monthly, and quarterly financial time series. 
The index is representative of the entire U.S. financial system, contain-
ing broad coverage of money and debt and equity markets, as well as 
the traditional and “shadow” banking systems. It has been shown to 
be a useful tool in monitoring financial stability, aligning closely with 
historical episodes of financial stress (e.g., Brave and Butters 2011, 
2012b). 
By conditioning the NFCI data on the state of the business cycle, a 
leading signal for financial stress can sometimes also be obtained (Brave 
and Butters 2011). This can be seen in Figure 3.2, which depicts the 
full-time series of the NFCI and its adjusted counterpart, the ANFCI. 
The ANFCI rebenchmarks U.S. financial conditions around a historical 
mean that is typical for a given level of economic growth and infla-
tion (Brave and Kelley 2017). Positive (negative) values then denote 
tighter-than-average (looser-than-average) conditions on this basis. The 
ANFCI tends to display a slight lead on the NFCI in the run-up and 
aftermath of periods of financial stress. In addition, Brave and Genay 
(2011) find that it was also a useful predictor of Federal Reserve policy 
actions taken during the global financial crisis. 
The indicators underlying the NFCI can be broadly classified into 
three types: 1) risk, 2) credit, and 3) leverage. These classifications 
are used in Brave and Butters (2012b) to construct subindexes of the 
NFCI (labeled risk, credit, and leverage) and highlight features of the 
financial cycle. Risk indicators capture volatility and funding risk in the 
financial sector and tend to be coincident indicators of financial stress. 
Credit indicators describe credit conditions in the nonfinancial sector 
and tend to be lagging indicators of financial stress. Finally, leverage 
indicators are measures of debt and equity in both sectors and tend to 
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In order to demonstrate these features, Figure 3.4 repeats the ROC
analysis technique from the previous section on the three NFCI sub-
indexes. For the subindexes, we classify the financial cycle based on 
a realization of the overall NFCI being positive or negative. Here, the 
x-axis values of the panels of the figure correspond to weekly leads or 
lags, while the y-axes continue to display AUC values. From the fig-
ure, it is clear that the risk subindex is a highly coincident indicator of 
financial stress (i.e., weeks where NFCI > 0), with a peak AUC value of 
0.99 at a zero-week lag. On the other hand, the credit subindex tends to 
lag behind periods of stress by about a month, with a lower peak AUC
value of 0.83, and the leverage subindex tends to lead periods of stress 
by about three months, with a lower peak AUC value of 0.78. 
The leading signal for financial stress provided by leverage indica-
tors can be further enhanced by isolating a subset of indicators for nonfi-
nancial businesses and households. The resulting nonfinancial leverage 
Figure 3.4  AUCs at Weekly Leads and Lags of the Financial Cycle 
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subindex tends to lead periods of stress by almost nine months, with a 
peak AUC value of 0.73, as seen in the bottom right panel of Figure 3.4. 
Brave and Butters (2012a) show that this particular subindex can be a 
useful early warning indicator, as it displays a significant lead with both 
the business and financial cycles and offers a superior view of potential 
financial imbalances in firm and household balance sheets in compari-
son with alternative measures like the private credit-to-GDP ratio. In 
addition, Brave and Lopez (2019) use this subindex to construct a prob-
ability of financial instability for the United States and then show how 
it can be used as a guidepost for macroprudential policymakers. 
CONCLUSION 
While it was not a point of focus in this chapter, it is worth mention-
ing that the activity index methodology can also be applied to quali-
tative, or survey-based, data just as easily as the quantitative govern-
ment or market-based data focused on here. For example, Brave and 
Walstrum (2014) and Brave, Walstrum, and Berman (2015) develop 
an activity index methodology for quantifying survey responses col-
lected for the Chicago Fed’s Beige Book contribution. This work led 
to the introduction of the Chicago Fed Survey of Business Conditions 
(CFSBC).4 Walstrum (2017) then showed how the CFSBC Activity 
Index could be used to forecast current-quarter GDP growth, much as 
with traditional activity indexes. 
It is also worth noting that the development of activity indexes con-
tinues to be an active and expanding area of research, with the work 
of the Chicago Fed only a small part of that process. Within the Fed-
eral Reserve system, a number of indexes related to ours are also pub-
lished, including various financial stress indexes and national and local 
business-conditions indexes.5 Many foreign central banks and govern-
mental agencies also produce similar indexes to ours in order to bet-
ter understand fluctuations in their parts of the world. The success of 
these measures in capturing business and financial cycles and in aiding 
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Notes 
Prepared for the 2018−2019 Werner Sichel Lecture Series at Western Michigan Uni-
versity. The views expressed herein are my own and do not necessarily represent those 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System. I would like to 
thank Dr. C. James Hueng and the WMU faculty and students for their hospitality; and 
the team of economists, research analysts, and assistants, as well as the editorial and 
public affairs staff, who support the production of these indexes at the Chicago Fed. 
For more information on the Chicago Fed’s economic and financial activity indexes, 
please go to chicagofed.org/research/data/index. To sign up for email notifications of 
any Chicago Fed index release, go to chicagofed.org/utilities/subscribe. 
1. PCA can also be extended to handle some of these issues. See, for example, the 
alterations described in Stock and Watson (2002b). 
2. As defined above, AUC values greater than 0.5 are consistent with a procyclical 
measure, and values less than 0.5 are consistent with a countercyclical measure. 
Wherever necessary, I have applied the convention of multiplying the indicator by 
1 in order to assure that only AUC values greater than or equal to 0.5 are plotted. 
Without this sign convention, one would arrive at the overall accuracy of a coun-
tercyclical indicator by taking 1 minus its AUC value. 
3. For more information on the MEI and DEAI, go to www.chicagofed.org/mei and 
www.chicagofed.org/deai. 
4. For more information on the CFSBC, go to www.chicagofed.org/cfsbc. 
5. See, for example, the metro business cycle indexes described in Arias, Gascon, 
and Rapach (2016) and maintained by the St. Louis Fed. 
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Economists at policy institutions, trading desks, and media outlets 
rely on economic data produced by various statistical agencies to under-
stand the state of the economy and predict its future path. However, the 
highest-quality and most comprehensive economic data are published 
with long delays after the periods to which they refer. Most notably, 
gross domestic product (GDP), the most comprehensive measure of 
U.S. economic activity, is first published by the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) one month after the end of each reference quarter, and 
these initial estimates are later revised. 
Faced with the challenging task of monitoring macroeconomic 
conditions in real time, analysts track a wide variety of data releases, 
distilling signal from noise in incoming data and revising their beliefs 
about the state of the economy when these data diverge significantly 
from their expectations. The Nowcasting Report of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York (the New York Fed Staff Nowcast) formalizes and 
automates this process through an econometric model–based approach. 
The platform produces nowcasts of economic activity—predictions for 
the present, recent past, and near future—which are continually updated 
as new data become available. The platform’s nowcasts of real GDP
growth can be computed before the start of the reference quarter and 
updated each day to incorporate the most recent information, providing 
useful real-time readings on the state of the economy that can be used 






42 Giannone et al. 
In this chapter, we provide a brief overview of the general challenge 
of monitoring macroeconomic conditions in real time and the methods 
underlying the New York Fed Staff Nowcast. We then present two case 
studies that assess the ability of the New York Fed Staff Nowcast to 
provide accurate early estimates of GDP during important real-world 
situations. 
First, we study the day-by-day movements in the GDP growth now-
cast during two critical quarters of the 2007–2009 recession. The model 
is able to predict major swings in economic activity (both upward 
and downward) long before the publication of the first official GDP
estimates, providing confidence in its ability to track business cycle 
fluctuations. 
Second, motivated by extensive data publication delays resulting 
from the 2018–2019 partial shutdown of the U.S. federal government, 
we conduct a counterfactual exercise to evaluate the performance of the 
nowcast during periods of severe yet realistic disruptions to the stan-
dard flow of macroeconomic data. Even during such periods, the now-
cast can predict GDP growth with an accuracy comparable to the BEA’s 
first official estimate; in particular, it can serve as a useful substitute for 
the official estimate if it is not published according to schedule (as was 
the case in early 2019). 
THE REAL-TIME DATA FLOW
As mentioned, in order to understand the state of the economy in 
real time, economists must extract signal from noise in a broad set of 
economic data. At any given point in time, economists face a trade-off 
between timeliness and quality when evaluating the most recent avail-
able data for each indicator. Business and consumer sentiment indica-
tors—often referred to by market commentators as soft data—provide 
the first readings on economic activity during a particular reference 
period. Labor market indicators typically arrive next; most notably, the 
widely followed Employment Situation Report, released by the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS), provides estimates of the unemployment rate 
and payroll employment shortly after the end of the month to which 
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to arrive several weeks later. Finally, the first estimate of gross domes-
tic product—the total value of all goods and services produced in the 
United States over a given quarter—is published by the Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA) roughly one month after the end of the reference 
quarter. Data of the highest quality and broadest coverage are thus only 
available well after the end of the period to which they refer. 
The trade-off between timeliness and accuracy is present not only 
across different economic indicators, but also across different releases 
for the same indicator. In the case of GDP, the BEA produces bench-
mark estimates every five years that rely on data collected through a 
comprehensive economic census, covering around seven million busi-
nesses with paid employees and over 95 percent of the expenditures 
included in GDP. Between these benchmark estimates, annual and quar-
terly estimates are constructed using surveys conducted by the Census 
Bureau—with 150,000 and 35,000 reporting units, respectively—as 
well as administrative data (such as those from the Internal Revenue 
Service) and estimates from other sources (such as BLS employment 
data). In short, these benchmark revisions are the product of care-
ful aggregation of detailed microeconomic information into national 
accounts. In contrast, the “advance” GDP release is the first official 
estimate available, with only a one-month delay. It is constructed using 
only half of the hard expenditure data ultimately used in the bench-
mark revisions and relies heavily on survey data gleaned by the Census 
Bureau. As a result of these unavoidable shortcuts required to produce 
timely estimates, these first estimates of GDP are subject to sizable revi-
sions as higher-quality source data become available. What is gained 
through detailed microeconomic information is lost in timeliness. 
With new data being released almost every day, and each release 
providing estimates for a large number of variables over a single refer-
ence period, economists face a big-data problem when attempting to 
monitor economic conditions. As an illustration, Figure 4.1 provides a 
useful visualization of the data at our disposal. The three-dimensional 
surface plot displays the path of 37 major economic indicators since 
1985, with each data series colored according to its category.1 The heat 
map on the horizontal plane presents a two-dimensional visualization 
of the same data: brighter yellow values indicate realizations above the 
sample mean for a given series, while darker red values indicate real-
izations well below the mean. The dark red areas are especially preva-
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Figure 4.1  Big Data in Macroeconomics 
Housing and construction 
Manufacturing 
Surveys 







     NOTE: The three-dimensional surface plot displays the standardized time series for the 
major economic indicators since 1985, which are shaded by category as indicated in 
the legend. Recessions are marked by transparent gray surfaces. The heat map on the 
horizontal plane shows positive and negative readings of the data. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on data accessed through Haver Analytics and 
the Federal Reserve Economic Database (FRED). 
lent across many series during the recessions of the early 1990s, early 
2000s, and (most notably) 2008 through 2009. In these periods, broad 
red strips across the heat map highlight the common downward move-
ment across many series. However, despite the stark common move-
ments across these series during both recessions and expansions, at any 
given point in time there are also individual series whose movements 
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NOWCASTING 
Nowcasting refers to the process of monitoring economic condi-
tions by forming predictions for economic activity in the present, recent 
past, and near future. Nowcasting is a big-data problem, given the vast 
array of macroeconomic data at our disposal. The New York Fed Now-
cast summarizes the rich and complex dataset depicted in Figure 4.1 
using a parsimonious model motivated by the strong comovements evi-
dent among the series. The model formalizes the notion of a common 
business-cycle component present across all of these series and allows 
one to distill signal from noise by filtering out fluctuations specific to 
individual variables from incoming data. 
The New York Fed Staff Nowcast is based upon a dynamic-factor 
model, which solves the “large n, small T” problem of relatively few 
time observations T compared to the large number of available data 
series n. It does this through dimension reduction: a small number of 
unobserved common factors are used to summarize the bulk of fluctua-
tions in the observed variables. Forni et al. (2000) and Stock and Watson
(2002a,b) presented the first applications of dynamic-factor models to 
large macroeconomic data sets, while Giannone, Reichlin, and Small 
(2008) demonstrate that these models can be used to reliably predict 
GDP growth in real time. Over the past decade, nowcasting models 
have been developed for many countries (see Bańbura et al. [2013] 
and Bok et al. [2018] for a survey).The dynamic-factor model can 
be easily cast in state space form, allowing for efficient estimation of 
both unknown parameters and unobserved common factors using the
Kalman filter (Bańbura and Modugno 2014; Doz, Giannone, and
Reichlin 2011). Moreover, the process by which the model’s GDP
growth forecasts are updated upon the release of new data can be inter-
preted in an intuitive manner that mimics market participants’ process-
ing of information. Before each data release, a new value is predicted 
for each variable based on previously available information. Once the 
new data are released, the model updates its forecast for GDP growth 
based on the discrepancy between predicted and realized values of all 
the variables; we refer to this discrepancy as news. If the model’s predic-
tions for each variable are exactly correct, its GDP growth forecast will 
remain unchanged, just as market participants would not revise their 
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beliefs about the state of the economy in the absence of news. On the 
other hand, if the model’s predictions are not exactly correct, its GDP
growth forecast will be revised to account for the news, just as market 
participants who observe stronger- or weaker-than-expected data would 
revise their beliefs about the state of the economy accordingly. 
More formally, revisions to the model’s GDP growth forecasts are 
simply a weighted sum of news across all data releases. The sign of these 
weights encodes whether a higher-than-expected value for each release 
represents “good” or “bad” news (e.g., payroll employment versus the 
unemployment rate). The magnitude of the weights encodes the overall 
information content that the news provides on economic conditions in 
a particular period, taking into account factors like timeliness and the 
extent to which each variable is driven by common versus idiosyncratic 
fluctuations. The model is thus able to determine which data releases 
are most important for monitoring current economic conditions, just as 
market participants place greater emphasis on some data releases than 
others (as evidenced by sharp asset price movements typical upon the 
release of closely followed indicators like GDP). 
The New York Fed Nowcast therefore provides a platform for inter-
preting the flow of data in real time. By determining each new observa-
tion’s impact on predicted GDP growth, the model provides a “com-
mon unit” for comparing news across series like payroll employment 
and the unemployment rate. Additionally, the GDP growth forecasts 
are updated in a fully automated and judgment-free manner, allowing 
for continuous updates as soon as new information becomes available. 
And, these forecasts are available well before the publication of the 
first official estimate, which occurs one month after the end of each 
reference quarter. A detailed description of the model and the data is 
provided in Bok et al. (2018). 
REAL-TIME ESTIMATES: TWO CASE STUDIES 
We now present two case studies that illustrate the real-time perfor-
mance of the New York Fed Staff Nowcast in two scenarios in which 
early and accurate GDP estimates serve a particularly important role in 
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studies, we make use of a daily real-time database that tracks the exact 
data available for each of the model’s 37 input series on each date from 
October 1, 2001, to the present. By using real-time data to recursively 
estimate the model’s parameters at the start of each quarter and update 
the GDP growth estimates using the new data available on each date, 
we are able to exactly reconstruct the estimates that forecasters would 
have obtained using our model in the past. Complete archives of both 
the reconstructed and real-time New York Fed Staff Nowcast estimates 
are available to the public and are described in Adams, Giannone, et al. 
(2019).2 
Nowcasting the Great Recession 
In our first case study, we track the day-by-day movements in the 
nowcast for GDP growth during two critical quarters of the 2007–2009 
recession. The fourth quarter of 2008 saw the sharpest decline in real 
economic activity, while the third quarter of 2009 marked the end of 
the recession and the beginning of the recovery. For both quarters, we 
chart the progression of the GDP growth nowcast (represented by black 
diamonds), starting one month before the start of the quarter and end-
ing one month after the end of the quarter after the BEA publishes the 
first official GDP estimate. Colored bars denote the overall contribu-
tions of data releases from different categories—surveys, retail and 
consumption, and more—to the weekly changes in the nowcast, based 
on the decompositions described in the second section. For comparison 
against official estimates, we also plot both the BEA’s first and latest 
estimates for each quarter.3 
The fourth quarter of 2008 was the worst of the recession, with real 
GDP contracting by 8.4 percent. On September 12, 2008 (right before 
the failure of Lehman Brothers was announced on September 15), our 
forecast for GDP growth for the fourth quarter of 2008 actually stood at 
a promising 3.1 percent. This estimate quickly changed as data on busi-
ness sentiment, industrial production, and retail sales for the month of 
September became available, and our nowcast first dropped into nega-
tive territory roughly one month after Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy 
on October 17. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
Recession Dating Committee officially announced on December 1, 
2008, that the economy had been in recession for the past 12 months. 
 
 
48 Giannone et al. 
On the previous Friday, our nowcast for GDP growth in 2008:Q4 was 
−1.5 percent (Figure 4.2). Additional negative data releases over the 
next two months led to further declines in our nowcast, until our final 
prediction sank to −3.6 percent immediately before the advance GDP
release in January 2009. Although we predicted the BEA’s advance esti-
mate almost exactly, this first estimate understated the severity of the 
contraction and was later revised downward substantially. 
The third quarter of 2009 marked the end of the recession, as deter-
mined by the NBER Recession Dating Committee one year later. At 
the start of the quarter in July, our nowcast still predicted slightly nega-
tive GDP growth. However, over the next few months, a wide variety 
Figure 4.2  Nowcasting the Great Recession in 2008:Q4 
NOTE: Colored bars reflect the impact of each data release on the nowcast. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on data accessed through Haver Analytics. 
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of better-than-expected data was released (especially for manufactur-
ing, international trade, and business sentiment), and our nowcast for 
2009:Q3 GDP growth (Figure 4.3) rose to over 5 percent by the end of 
the quarter. Our model successfully predicted the timing of the recov-
ery but turned out to be overly optimistic in predicting its strength: the 
advance estimate of GDP growth in 2009:Q3 was 3.5 percent, but this 
estimate was later revised downward, as the latest available estimate 
reported growth of only 1.5 percent. 
For both of these important quarters, the nowcast provided an early 
and reliable signal of the direction in which growth was headed, months 
before the publication of the first official estimate. These results provide 
Figure 4.3  Nowcasting the Recovery in 2009:Q3 
NOTE: Colored bars reflect the impact of each data release on the nowcast. 
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confidence that the New York Fed Staff Nowcast can provide useful 
early readings on upward and downward swings in activity by filtering 
through a variety of incoming data ahead of the publication of official 
GDP estimates. The large revisions from the first to the latest published 
estimates show that producing estimates with both minimal delay and 
high precision is a challenge even for the BEA. The contribution of the 
New York Fed Staff Nowcast is to extend the “accuracy timeliness” 
frontier in the period before official statistics are available. 
Nowcasting with Scarce Data 
In our second case study, we evaluate the performance of the now-
cast during periods of severe yet realistic disruptions to the standard flow 
of macroeconomic data. This exercise is motivated by the 2018−2019 
U.S. federal government partial shutdown, during which the temporary 
closure of the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
delayed the publication of many scheduled data releases. While the 
most notable delayed release was the first estimate of 2018:Q4 GDP
(which was postponed by one month), many other widely followed 
indicators of economic activity were released with substantial delays, 
including retail sales, home sales and construction, imports and exports, 
and durable goods orders.4 However, a variety of other data sources— 
both hard data directly measuring activity and soft data measuring busi-
ness sentiment—were published as previously scheduled. 
Do such disruptions to the regular data publication schedule impair 
the ability of the New York Fed Staff Nowcast to accurately predict 
GDP growth? To answer this question, we conduct a counterfactual 
exercise in which we simulate similar dataflow disruptions for each 
quarter from 2002:Q1 to 2017:Q4, as if the Census Bureau and BEA
had ceased publication of all new data releases starting one week before 
the end of the quarter. We assume that data previously published by 
these agencies remain available, and that new data published by other 
government agencies and private organizations become available as 
they are released in real time. We then evaluate the performance of our 
nowcasting model in this “scarce data” setting by studying the empiri-
cal distribution of its forecast errors for GDP growth, which provides a 
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Figure 4.4 plots GDP growth forecast errors for all quarters in our 
evaluation sample, based on the number of weeks remaining until the 
first GDP release at the date of each forecast (listed across the hori-
zontal axis). The black dots represent the historical forecast errors for 
our nowcasting model (using the actual data available in real time), 
Figure 4.4  Similar Data Delays Would Not Have Drastically Changed 
Past Predictions 
NOTE: Points represent quarterly GDP growth forecast errors (for Nowcast-Actual and 
Shutdown) and revision errors (for the Bureau of Economic Analysis first release), 
computed with respect to the latest available estimates for the years 2002 through 
2017. Shaded bands depict the 16th and 84th percentiles of the historical forecast 
errors, while the red lines at week 0 depict the same percentiles for revisions to the 
first release. 
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computed using the latest available GDP growth estimates.5 The gold 
diamonds represent our model’s forecast errors under the counterfac-
tual scenario when key data releases are delayed, starting roughly four 
weeks before the first GDP release. The red triangles represent revision 
errors, from the first estimate published by the BEA for each quarter 
to the latest available estimates. Shaded bands depict the 16th to 84th 
percentile range of the errors for each forecast, while the red line on the 
week of the first GDP release depicts the same range for revision errors 
from the BEA’s first to latest releases; these ranges provide an assess-
ment of uncertainty for each of the three forecasts. 
Overall, the model’s forecasts for GDP growth remain accurate 
even when there are substantial disruptions to the usual pattern of data 
availability. For the weeks leading up to the first GDP release, the his-
torical forecast error distributions represented by the black and gold 
markers are broadly similar, indicating that the accuracy of the nowcast 
is mostly unchanged when new Census Bureau and BEA data releases 
are not published. Moreover, under these conditions, the gold uncer-
tainty bands reported for the nowcast are similar in width to the red bar 
at the week of the first GDP release, depicting uncertainty around this 
estimate. Therefore, the finding of Bok et al. (2018)—that uncertainty 
is similar around both the final nowcasts for a given quarter and the first 
GDP release—still holds, even when important data are not released 
according to their usual schedule, as was the case during the 2018–2019 
federal government shutdown. Moreover, if the first release of GDP
also happens to be delayed during these periods, the nowcast provides 
an alternative estimate of GDP growth of comparable accuracy to the 
first release. 
Figure 4.5 presents an alternative visualization of the forecast error 
distributions for the nowcast (both the actual historical forecast errors 
and the errors under our counterfactual scenario based on the govern-
ment shutdown) and first official GDP release. The left panel depicts 
the smoothed empirical distribution of the three sets of forecast errors 
plotted along the vertical line at the week of the first GDP release from 
the previous figure. The right panel depicts the distribution of forecast 
errors for current-quarter projections at the time of the previous quar-
ter’s first GDP release—e.g., the projections for 2019:Q1 GDP growth 
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Figure 4.5  Nowcast with Delayed Data Similarly Accurate to BEA First 
Release 
NOTE: The figures report kernel-smoother estimates of forecast error densities as of 
the scheduled first GDP release (week of February 1, 2019). The left panel gives error 
distributions for the previous quarter (2018:Q4). The right panel gives error distribu-
tions for 2019:Q1. Black lines refer to the actual nowcast errors, gold dashed lines 
refer to nowcast shutdown errors, and red dotted lines refer to the BEA revision errors. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations, based on data accessed through Haver Analytics. 
As noted in the discussion of the previous figure, the three forecast 
error distributions are broadly similar, indicating that the nowcast pro-
vides estimates of GDP growth with comparable accuracy to the first 
official release, even under conditions of data scarcity similar to those 
resulting from the 2018–2019 U.S. federal government shutdown. The 
main differences between these distributions arise from large negative 
forecast errors, which are more likely to occur for the nowcast than for 
the BEA estimates. Moving to the right panel, both distributions for the 
model’s longer-horizon forecast errors display greater dispersion than 
their shorter-horizon counterparts in the left panel, reflecting greater 
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uncertainty when making predictions for the current (as opposed to 
the previous) quarter. The striking similarity of the model’s actual and 
counterfactual forecast errors reported in the right panel illustrates that 
data scarcity, similar to the scarcity of data resulting from the 2018– 
2019 U.S. federal government shutdown, does not blunt the accuracy of 
early projections for the current quarter. 
Finally, Figure 4.6 displays the real-time progression of the GDP
growth nowcast for 2018:Q4. The effects of the shutdown-related data 
publication delays can be seen through the paucity of colorful bars from 
late December through early January. While our model’s prediction was 
quite close to the first official estimate released in February 2019, the 
Figure 4.6  Nowcasting during the Government Shutdown 
NOTE: Colored bars reflect the impact of each data release on the nowcast. 
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latest available estimate is notably lower than both of these early esti-
mates, highlighting the uncertainty about economic activity that pre-
vails even after official statistics are initially published. 
CONCLUSION 
The New York Fed Staff Nowcast is able to produce accurate and 
early estimates of real GDP growth well before the publication of the 
BEA’s first official estimates. We presented two case studies that evalu-
ate the model’s performance during the Great Recession and during 
the U.S. federal government shutdown at the beginning of 2019. We 
encourage interested readers to further study our model by exploring 
our online interactive archives, which collect both real-time forecasts 
for the period from 2016:Q1 to the present and reconstructed historical 
forecasts extending back to 2002:Q1.6 
Notes 
The views expressed in this chapter are those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the position of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the Federal Reserve 
System, or the Upjohn Institute. 
1. The full list of all 37 series is presented in Bok et al. (2018). Each series is appro-
priately transformed in order to induce stationarity, then standardized so that all
variables have the same mean and variance over the sample period. 
2. These archives can be explored in interactive form at the following link: https:// 
www.newyorkfed.org/research/policy/nowcast. 
3. The latest available estimates are based on data published by the BEA in July
2019. 
4. For a full list of data releases delayed because of the shutdown, see Adams, Qian,
et al. (2019). 
5. We use the latest available estimates, since these reflect both 1) new source data
that become available after the publication of the first estimate and 2) method-
ological changes intended to improve the quality of the estimates. 
6. These archives (along with structured data files containing historical forecasts)
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5 
Real-Time Measurement 
of Business Conditions, 
Macroeconomic Surprises, 
and Uncertainty 
Is a Recession Looming? 
Alessandro Barbarino 
Chiara Scotti 
Federal Reserve Board 
As pointed out by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 2019), the 
current economic expansion has lasted more than nine years, becom-
ing one of the longest expansions since 1945.1 Because of such a long 
boom, some people think that a recession might be due soon. In January 
2019, for example, the Wall Street Journal published a survey showing 
a 25 percent probability of recession in the next year, the highest level 
since October 2011 and twice the probability of one year ago. Similarly, 
the Blue Chip Indicators for January 2019 reported a consensus survey 
result for the probability of a recession in 2019 at 25 percent and the 
probability of a recession in 2020 at 37 percent. Reportedly, one of the 
reasons the Dow 30 and S&P 500 indexes both fell by more than 15 
percent in December 2018 was from a concern that the economy would 
fall into a recession in late 2019 or 2020, prompting negative earnings 
growth. 
This chapter focuses first on evaluating current business conditions 
in the United States, based on real-activity economic indicators, as well 
as on gauging market participants’ optimism or pessimism about the 
economy and the uncertainty around this evaluation. Second, it evalu-
ates some recession probability models that make use of a variety of 
data to pinpoint whether indeed a recession is looming. 
57 
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To evaluate business conditions, we look at the Aruoba, Diebold, 
and Scotti (2009) business condition index (henceforth, “ADS index”) 
as well as the Scotti (2016) surprise and uncertainty indexes updated 
with the most current data. The ADS index turned negative in early 
2019, suggesting worse-than-average conditions for the U.S. economy 
over the preceding months.2 Economic surprises and uncertainty are 
evaluated using the Scotti (2016) indexes. The surprise index spiked 
early in 2019, as market participants were more pessimistic than war-
ranted by economic releases, but then sharply collapsed following the 
release of the February employment report in early March. The uncer-
tainty index steadily increased at the beginning of 2019, reaching levels 
last seen in late 2017. 
Given this assessment, should we conclude that a recession is loom-
ing, as suggested by the CBO analysis? In order to tackle this ques-
tion, we review the prediction of extant recession forecasting models 
by feeding them a variety of data, including the real-time indicators 
discussed in the first part of this chapter, a larger set of individual macro 
variables, and financial variables (like level, slope, curvature, corporate 
spreads, and so forth). When using individual data, to make sure we 
have entries for all the variables until the last data point, we truncate 
the sample in December 2018 (even if for some data series we have 
data until the day before we ran the estimation in March 2019) and find 
an increased probability of recession in mid-2019, possibly due to the 
big correction observed in financial markets in late 2018. When we re-
estimate the recession probabilities employing only the ADS index as a 
summary statistic of the real indicators, which is available in real time 
and allows us to take care of the ragged edges of the data, the estimated 
probabilities significantly decrease. Our analysis also shows that, con-
sistent with Berge (2015), real variables appear to be more powerful 
in signaling recessions at shorter horizons, while the term spread and 
some additional financial variables are valuable leading indicators at 
longer horizons—that is, at horizons of 6–12 months ahead and beyond. 
The remainder of the chapter discusses the real-time measurement 
of business conditions in the next section, the real-time evaluation of 
optimism/pessimism and uncertainty about the state of the economy in 
the section after that, and the evaluation of recession probability models 
with a variety of data in the fourth section. The final section offers our 
conclusions. 
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REAL-TIME MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 
Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti (2009) state the following: 
Aggregate business conditions are of central importance in the 
business, finance, and policy communities, worldwide, and huge 
resources are devoted to the assessment of the continuously evolv-
ing state of the real economy. Literally thousands of newspapers, 
newsletters, television shows, and blogs, not to mention armies of 
employees in manufacturing and service industries, including the 
financial services industries, central banks, government and non-
government organizations, grapple constantly with the measure-
ment and forecasting of evolving business conditions. 
Complications to this assessment include the fact that business con-
ditions are latent, data are released at different times and therefore not 
always all available at the time of the evaluation, and they are at differ-
ent frequencies. The latency of the business cycle means that the busi-
ness cycle is not directly observed, as it is not represented by any single 
variable, but rather, it is derived by information contained in a number 
of indicators like gross domestic product (GDP), industrial production 
(IP), employment, and so on. In fact, the National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER) does not define a recession in terms of only one indi-
cator of activity, such as two consecutive quarters of decline in real 
GDP, but as a significant decline in economic activity spread across the 
economy, lasting more than a few months, normally visible in real GDP, 
real income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail 
sales.3 
Data are released at different times. For example, nonfarm payroll 
is announced the first Friday of the month, and initial jobless claims 
are released weekly on Thursday. Assume that it is Tuesday, February 
26, 2019, and we are trying to assess the current state of the economy 
for the first quarter of 2019. We only have partial information available 
relative to that quarter. The January nonfarm payroll is available, but 
the February job market report will not be available until the coming 
Friday. Likewise, as of February 26, initial jobless claims releases are 
available only for the first seven weeks of the year. In addition, GDP 
data relative to the first quarter will be released only a quarter later. 
This ragged-edge structure of the data complicates the evaluation of 
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real-time business conditions, as we need to juggle data series of dif-
ferent lengths. 
In addition, data have different frequencies, covering various units 
of time. For example, GDP is quarterly, nonfarm payroll is monthly, and 
initial jobless claim is weekly. An assessment of business conditions 
needs to take this into account and be able to accommodate the differ-
ent units and the aggregation that makes weekly series comparable to 
monthly or quarterly variables. 
The empirical business cycle literature has dealt with these fea-
tures through alternative approaches, including the dynamic factor 
framework, whether from the “small data” perspective, as in Aruoba, 
Diebold, and Scotti (2009); Chauvet (1998); Diebold and Rudebusch 
(1996); and Stock and Watson (1989), or the “big data” perspective, as 
in the seminal work of Bai and Ng (2006); Forni et al. (2000); and Stock 
and Watson (1991, 2002). Aruoba, Diebold, and Scotti (2009) propose 
a framework to measure economic activity in real time using a dynamic 
factor model that combines a small set of time series at different fre-
quencies. In particular, the ADS index is designed to track real business 
conditions at a high frequency, combining information from (seasonally 
adjusted) economic indicators: weekly initial jobless claims, monthly 
payroll employment, monthly industrial production, monthly personal 
income less transfer payments, monthly manufacturing and trade sales, 
and quarterly real GDP. The Philadelphia Fed updates the index as soon 
as new data releases become available. Figure 5.1 displays the ADS 
index as of March 15, 2019. Of note, the average value of the index is 
zero, with progressively bigger positive values indicating progressively 
better-than-average conditions, and progressively more negative values 
indicating progressively worse-than-average conditions. The business 
condition index in Figure 5.1 is based on the information available as of 
March 2019. The index might look different, though, when computed 
on different data vintages. Figure 5.2, for example, shows the ADS 
index computed in real time in March 2019 and contrasts it against the 
index computed on different data vintages ranging from 11 to 2 years 
prior to March 2019. The ADS index computed on the December 2008 
data vintage ends in December 2008 and, likewise, lines for the indexes 
computed on data vintages in 2009, 2014, 2017, and 2019 end in the 
respective years. Looking at the last recession, the real-time estimate 
of the index turned out to be overly optimistic, and it was subsequently 
revised downward, as shown by the wedge between the 2008 vintage (in 
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NOTE: The ADS is constructed using the latest data available as of March 15, 2019. 
Grey shading indicates NBER-designated recessions. The limits used on the y-axis 
reflect the minimum and maximum values of the index over the entire history. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, ADS Business Conditions Index. 











NOTE: The ADS indexes are constructed using data available up to the date indicated 
in the legend. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, ADS Business Conditions Index. 
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blue) and the March 2019 vintage (the black line). Focusing on recent 
years, Figure 5.3 shows the tentacle plot of the 10 vintages of data prior 
to March 2019. After a couple of positive estimates at the beginning of 
the year, the ADS index was subsequently revised downward into nega-
tive territory relative to estimates computed on earlier data vintages. 
Both the new data releases and the revisions of previous data explain 
the downward revision. 
REAL-TIME EVALUATION OF OPTIMISM/PESSIMISM 
AND UNCERTAINTY 
While the ADS index measures the state of the economy and serves 
as a summary statistic of the information that market participants have 
received thus far about real activity, it is silent with respect to whether 
this information is in line with what market participants are expect-











NOTE: The ADS indexes are constructed using data available up to the date indicated 
in the legend. 
SOURCE: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, ADS Business Conditions Index. 
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ing and the uncertainty surrounding the data releases. The surprise and 
uncertainty indexes in Scotti (2016) speak to these issues. The surprise 
index summarizes recent economic data surprises and measures devia-
tions from consensus expectations. A positive (negative) reading of the 
index indicates that agents were more pessimistic (optimistic), expect-
ing economic data to be worse (better) than their actual realization. The 
uncertainty index measures the uncertainty related to the state of the 
economy. A greater (smaller) reading suggests that agents have, on bal-
ance, been more (less) uncertain about business conditions. 
Figure 5.4 displays the surprise index computed as of March 2019. 
The surprise index reached its lowest value during the global financial 
crisis of 2008–2009, suggesting that as the crisis was unfolding, agents 
were less pessimistic about its possible outcome and its impact on the 
real economy. In contrast, the index turned positive during the begin-
ning of 2019, indicating that agents were pessimistic about the state of 
the economy, harboring fairly low expectations relative to the actual 








NOTE: The Scotti (2016) Surprise Index summarizes recent economic data surprises 
and measures deviations from consensus expectations. A positive (negative) reading 
of the surprise index indicates that agents were more pessimistic (optimistic), expect-
ing economic data to be better (worse) than their actual realization. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on Bloomberg and NBER recession dates. 
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releases of GDP, IP, and nonfarm payroll. However, the index turned 
sharply negative in early March following the release of the February 
employment report. 
Figure 5.5 portrays the uncertainty index, which tends to be elevated 
during recessions. Although there are some nonrecessionary periods in 
which the index spikes, it is interesting to note that the index increased 
in early 2019, reaching highs previously seen in 2017. This suggests 
that agents were less certain about the state of the economy. 










NOTE: The Scotti (2016) Uncertainty Index measures the uncertainty related to the 
state of the economy. A greater (smaller) reading suggests that agents have on balance 
been more (less) uncertain about business conditions. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on Bloomberg and NBER recession dates. 
IS A RECESSION LOOMING? 
Taken together, the several indexes presented so far suggest that 
business conditions in the United States have turned negative in early 
2019, providing fertile ground for a downturn. Does this mean that a 
recession is looming? 
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In order to address such questions, we turn to the ADS index to 
directly inform the probability of a recession. First off, note that fore-
casting a recession is a hard task, given that the NBER tends to identify 
recessions only after a 12- to 18-month lag. As Hamilton (2011) puts 
it, “If people could predict recessions, they probably would not happen. 
Firms would not be stuck with inventories, labor, and capital they turn 
out not to need, and the Federal Reserve would probably ease its policy 
stance earlier.” Following a long-standing academic literature on esti-
mating recession probabilities (see, for instance, Hamilton [2011] for 
an enlightening literature review), we use a probit model. We estimate 
the probability of being in a recession in the current quarter (that is, for 
a forecast horizon h = 0) only as a function of the ADS index instead 
of using a set of indicators. This stands as an alternative to customary 
estimates of recession probabilities, as can be seen from the review of 
relevant literature shown in Table 5.1, because we first embed in the 
ADS factor the information from the set of variables that constitute the 
ADS index, and then we feed the ADS index into the probit model. Our 
approach could be defined as “aggregate, then forecast,” paraphrasing 
the taxonomy laid out by Stock and Watson (2014). 
Fossati (2016) estimates a small-scale dynamic factor model (DFM) 
in order to estimate a recession probability probit, but his DFM con-
tains only monthly data (the same monthly data used in the ADS index), 
whereas the use of the ADS index allows us to automatically take care 
of mixed-frequency data and to include information on GDP.4 
Figure 5.6 shows the recession probability based on the ADS index 
from 1960 to March 2019.5 The recession probabilities computed before 
2009 are based on the mid-March 2019 vintage of the ADS index, while 
the probabilities from 2009 to 2019 (to the right of the vertical red line) 
are computed in real time using the ADS vintage available at the time 
indicated on the x-axis. In other words, in the latter part of the sample, 
a probit model is recursively estimated with the new ADS index that 
summarizes available data up to a particular date. Generally, the model 
exhibits high spikes during NBER recession periods (the gray shaded 
areas). With an exception for the early-2000s recession, the estimated 
probability during all the recessions reached at least 75 percent. A word 
of caution on Figure 5.6: since the estimate of the probability is not in 
real time before 2009, looking at the estimate before the vertical red line 
could be deceiving if one intends to use the estimates to call recessions 
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Table 5.1  Summary of Literature on Predicting Recessions 
Data Data Model Forecast Real-
Reference Data scale type freq. type type time 
Stock and Watson Small Real Monthly Factor from Backcasting No 
(1989) financial UC model Nowcasting 
Stock and Watson Medium Real Monthly Logit + factor Backcasting No 
(1991) financial from UC model Nowcasting 
Diebold and Small Financial Quarterly Markov switching None No 
Rudebusch DFM 
(1996) 
Chauvet (1998) Small Real Monthly Markov switching Backcasting No 
DFM Nowcasting 
Chauvet and Very Financial Monthly Dynamic probit Backcasting Yes 
Potter (2005) small Nowcasting 
Harding and Large Real Monthly Dating algorithm Backcasting No 
Pagan (2006) 
Wright (2006) Very Real Monthly Probit Forecasting Yes 
small 
Chauvet and Piger Small Real Monthly Dating algorithm Backcasting Yes 
(2008) Markov switching DFM 
Kauppi and Very Financial Monthly Generalized Backcasting Yes 
Saikkonen small dynamic probit Nowcasting 
(2008) 
Berge (2015) Medium Real Monthly BMA logit Backcasting Yes 
financial Nowcasting 
Fossati (2015) Small/ Real Monthly Dynamic probit DFM Forecasting Yes 
large Markov switching DFM 
Giusto and Piger Small Real Monthly Vector quantization Backcasting Yes 
(2017) financial 
This study Small/ Real Mixed: BMA logit Nowcasting Yes 
medium financial/ weekly/ DFM 
other monthly/ 
quarterly 
NOTE: The table presents a summary of the relevant literature on forecasting reces-
sions at different horizons with macroeconomic and financial data. The model is 
formulated but not estimated. Financial data are not revised—therefore they are, by 
construction, real-time. 
SOURCE: Authors’ compilation. 
in real time. That said, we verify that for the time window in which we 
have vintages of the ADS index, the real-time estimates are not drasti-
cally different from the estimate on the last vintage we used. 
Figure 5.7 zooms in on the most recent 10 years and compares the 
recession probabilities estimated using the mid-March 2019 ADS vin-
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Figure 5.6  Recession Probability Based on the ADS Index 
NOTE: The recession probabilities computed based on the “Last Vintage ADS” use 
information as of mid-March 2019, whereas probabilities based on the “Real Time 
ADS” use the ADS vintages available at the time indicated on the x-axis. Grey shad-
ing indicates NBER-designated recessions. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on Philadelphia Fed, ADS Business Conditions 
Index. 
tage with the estimate using the real-time ADS index available at the 
time indicated by the x-axis. Although the real-time recession probabil-
ity is more volatile when compared to the probability computed using 
the last vintage of data, the real-time estimate is substantially in agree-
ment and provides the same signal as the estimate from the last vintage 
that we have used. 
ADDITIONAL INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 
The ADS index is a coincident indicator, and the probability com-
puted above refers to the assessment that the economy is in recession 
in the corresponding month. This analysis could be expanded in two 
directions: 1) including alternative indicators as explanatory variables 
(individual macroeconomic series or financial series) and 2) forecasting 
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Figure 5.7  Recession Prob. Based on the ADS Index: Real-Time Versus 
Last-Vintage 
NOTE: The recession probabilities computed before 2009 are based on the February 
2019 vintage of the ADS index, while the probabilities from 2009 to 2019 are com-
puted in real time using the ADS vintage available at the time indicated on the x-axis. 
Grey shading indicates NBER-designated recessions. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on Philadelphia Fed, ADS Business Conditions 
Index. 
recession probabilities at different horizons. We investigate the second 
issue in the empirical analysis looking at a horizon of between 0 and 12 
months. With respect to the first item, we discuss here some additional 
indicators that have been explored in the literature, starting from the 
seminal work by Stock and Watson (1989), and then we use them in 
conjunction with the ADS index to understand the quality of the incre-
mental information that they provide in forecasting recessions. We find 
that financial indicators are very useful beyond the ADS index at longer 
forecast horizons. 
The term spread. Stock and Watson (1989) introduce yield 
spreads—in particular the spread between 10-year and 1-year T-bonds— 
as useful indicators in forecasting economic activity and downturns. 
Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) further explore the forecasting power 
of the slope of the Treasury yield curve as a leading indicator of down-
turns.6 Corroborating the findings in these studies, academics and mar-
ket participants point to the fact that a negative slope—a negative dif-
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maturity, typically between 2 years and 3 months—generally precedes 
economic recessions. Accordingly, recession probability models based 
uniquely on the term spread generally associate declining term spreads 
with an elevated probability of recession in the near/medium term.7 For 
example, in early 2019, a simple probit model based only on the term 
spread would have predicted a much higher probability of recession 
in the next 12 months. In fact, the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
assessed the probability of being in a recession by January 2020 at about 
30 percent using information from the yield curve as of mid-March 
2019.8 A variety of additional financial variables closely connected with 
the yield curve have been tested in forecasting turning points in the 
economy. For instance, Wright (2006) motivates the introduction of the 
average of the federal funds rate over a given quarter as it provides 
a measure of the impetus or restraint to the economy implied by the 
stance of monetary policy.9 In addition, Wright (2006) also finds some 
evidence that a measure of expected excess returns on longer-maturity 
bonds, the return forecasting factor studied by Cochrane and Piazzesi 
(2005), is useful in predicting recessions. In our empirical evaluation in 
the section titled “Real-Time Measurement of Economic Conditions,” 
we use both the level of the yield curve (as in Wright ([2006]) as well 
as slope and curvature. 
Corporate bond spreads. Stock and Watson (1989) introduce 
yield spreads as useful indicators in forecasting economic activity and 
downturns, and they find that the spread between commercial paper and 
Treasury bills is a leading indicator of recessions. Several other authors 
have found that corporate bond spreads—also called credit spreads— 
are useful indicators in predicting recessions. Stock and Watson (1989) 
used the paper-bill spread, and Gertler and Lown (1999) studied the 
high-yield credit spread. Both of these spreads have predictive content 
on economic activity because they embed default risk, which incor-
porates investors’ expectations of future corporate defaults. However, 
recent analysis in Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012) tries to distill the 
information on future economic activity in bond credit spreads beyond 
default risk and calls such a component the excess bond premium 
(EBP). Favara et al. (2016a) use the EBP in a probit model of reces-
sions.10 We include the most recent update of the EBP in the empirical 
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Other financial indicators. Beyond credit spreads, stock market 
returns and other financial information such as the implied stock market 
volatility—as measured by the Chicago Board Options Exchange vola-
tility index (VIX)—have been used to predict economic activity. For 
instance, Danielsson, Valenzuela, and Zer (2018) use the VIX in trying 
to explain financial crises, and Engstrom (2014) uses option pricing in 
trying to predict stock market crashes. We include the VIX as a regres-
sor in the models of the section “Real-Time Management of Economic 
Conditions.” 
USING THE ADS INDEX WITH ADDITIONAL INDICATORS 
IN FORECASTING RECESSIONS 
Berge (2015) finds that the term spread and some additional finan-
cial variables are valuable leading indicators, but mostly at longer hori-
zons—that is, at horizons of 6–12 months ahead, and beyond. Con-
versely, at shorter horizons, real variables appear to be more powerful 
in signaling recessions. 
We follow Berge (2015) and use a series of logit models, one for 
each horizon from 0 to 12 months, and a variety of real and financial 
explanatory variables, in order to explore the usefulness of the ADS 
index. Through Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA), we select the 
models containing the most useful indicators at each forecast horizon, 
reducing the dimensionality of our big system of models (with N indi-
cators, we have 2N possible models).11 The individual models are at the 
monthly frequency and contain a mixture of financial and real variables. 
Financial variables are as follows: the level, slope, and curvature of the 
yield curve; corporate bond spreads; the TED spread; the return on the 
S&P500; the trade-weighted dollar index; and the VIX. For macro indi-
cators, we compare three different sets of variables: 
1) the ADS index; 
2) the subset of real-activity variables used to compute the ADS 
index—specifically, nonfarm payroll, industrial production, 





Real-Time Measurement of Business Conditions  71 
3) a larger set of macro variables, including the variables that 
make up the ADS index, plus total light vehicle sales, the ISM 
purchasing managers’ index, average weekly hours, housing 
permits, and the four-week moving average of unemployment 
claims. 
Because the NBER announces turning points with a delay, and we 
do not want to incorrectly assume that a month in the recent past was or 
was not a recession (that is, assigning a 0 or 1 value to the logit depen-
dent variable), we estimate the model up to December 2017 and use 
those parameter estimates in the evaluation of the recession probabili-
ties. In this first step, our BMA approach selects the best combination 
of indicators at the different horizons, as shown by the heat map of the 
posterior inclusion probabilities in Figure 5.8. The darker color in the 
figure indicates a higher posterior probability that a particular variable 
(shown in the rows) is included in the model for that horizon (shown 
in the columns). We only show results for one of the models described 
above with financial and real variables.13 It should be clear from the fig-
ure that there is a predominance of darker colors in the lower-left quad-
rant and in the top right, indicating that real variables have higher inclu-
sion probabilities for shorter-horizon models, while financial variables 
have higher inclusion probabilities at longer horizons. An exercise in 
which we separate the estimation of a real-variable model and a finan-
cial-variable model highlights this finding even more, as already noted 
by Berge (2015). In fact, as shown in Figure 5.9, the Receiver Operat-
ing Characteristic (ROC) curves for the in-sample prediction from the 
1- and 12-month-ahead models point to a superior performance of the 
real variables at the 1-month horizon, but a better performance of the 
financial indicators at the 12-month horizon.14 
We then employ data up to December 2018 to forecast our indica-
tors through December 2019, using a random walk, and compute the 
corresponding recession probabilities for each horizon based on the best 
model selected in the previous step. Figure 5.10 shows such probabili-
ties for the three combinations of real variables outlined above. Interest-
ingly, all three models point to an increased probability of recession in 
mid-2019, possibly due to the big correction observed in financial mar-
kets in late 2018. Of note, the model with the ADS index performs just 
as well as the model in which the underlying series enter one by one. 
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Figure 5.8  Heat Map of Posterior Inclusion Probabilities 
NOTE: Posterior inclusion probabilities for each variable (rows) and each horizon (col-
umns) related to the model with the ADS index and financial variables. Darker colors 
indicate a high inclusion probability. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on NBER recession dates, BEA real disposable 
income. 
A drawback to this forecast exercise is that it does not allow for 
ragged edges in the data and mixed frequency, as it needs to stop at 
the last point in time for which all the series are available. To over-
come this issue, we reestimate the recession probabilities employing 
only the ADS index as a summary statistic of the real indicators plus 
GDP, which is available in real time. The estimated probabilities based 
on the ADS index and financial variables as of mid-March are shown 
in Figure 5.11. Based on the additional information available between 
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Figure 5.9  Heat Map of Posterior Inclusion Probabilities, ROC Curves 
NOTE: ROC curves for 1- and 12-month-ahead models with real or financial indicators. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on NBER recession dates, BEA real disposable 
income. 
the end of 2018 and mid-March, the probability of the NBER declaring 
a recession over the next year significantly decreased, in line with the 
ADS-only probability from Figure 5.7. 
CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we update and evaluate a number of economic indi-
cators as well as recession probability models. As pointed out by Berge 
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Figure 5.10  BMA Recession Probabilities, December 2018 
NOTE: Probability that the NBER will declare a recession in a particular month based 
on the BMA probit model. Forecast after December 2018 based on a random walk of 
the various indicators. Dotted line represents the unconditional probability. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on NBER recession dates, BEA real disposable 
income. 
(2015), different mixtures of real and financial variables work best at 
different horizons, suggesting the need to maintain a set of models that 
work well at different forecasting horizons. Because of the inability of 
probit models to account for ragged edges, a real-time indicator of real 
activity like the ADS index might prove useful to have more up-to-date 
forecasts of recession probabilities. 
The analysis of this topic, however, should not be limited to what 
is described above. For example, other indicators might be considered 
among the set of explanatory variables, along the lines of Engstrom 
and Sharpe (2018), who further qualify the most relevant term spread 
to forecast recessions. They argue that the near-term forward spread, 
computed as the difference between the implied forward rate on Trea-
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Figure 5.11 BMA Recession Probabilities, Mid-March 2019 
NOTE: Probability that the NBER will declare a recession in a particular month based 
on the BMA probit model. Forecast after March 2019 based on a random walk of the 
various indicators. Dotted line represents the unconditional probability. 
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations based on NBER recession dates, BEA real disposable 
income. 
sury bills six quarters ahead and the corresponding yield on a three-
month Treasury bill, is a better predictor compared to more traditional 
term spreads. The near-term forward spread can be interpreted as a 
measure of the market’s expectations for the trajectory of conventional 
near-term monetary policy. When negative, it indicates that market par-
ticipants expect monetary policy to ease on net over the next several 
quarters, presumably because they expect monetary policymakers to 
respond to the threat or onset of a recession.15 The superiority of using 
forward rates comes from the fact that, because yields are averages of 
the forward rates spanning the period to maturity, they tend to be a nois-
ier signal of the expected Fed actions. They corroborate this intuition by 
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10-year Treasury constant maturity minus two-year Treasury constant 
maturity spread sometimes used in the classical probit model. 
The national financial condition indicator (NFCI) maintained by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago could also potentially be used as a 
financial explanatory variable, just as the ADS index is used for real 
variables.16 The NFCI index provides a comprehensive weekly update 
on U.S. financial conditions in money markets, debt and equity mar-
kets, and the traditional and “shadow” banking systems. Alternatively, 
because U.S. economic and financial conditions tend to be highly cor-
related, the adjusted NFCI (ANFCI)—an index that isolates a compo-
nent of financial conditions uncorrelated with economic conditions to 
provide an update on financial conditions relative to current economic 
conditions—could be considered. 
Recession probabilities based on macroeconomic and financial 
indicators could additionally be compared to news-count measures of 
recession probabilities, such as the LexisNexis index of Berge and Jordà 
(2011) or the Google trends recession index also reported in Berge and 
Jordà, and used in an original way to set priors of a Bayesian DFM 
in Monokroussos (2015). The horizon of these news-count probabili-
ties is, however, not clear, as articles could talk about past, current, or 
future recessions. Therefore, a straight comparison with the measures 
described above might not be so straightforward.17 
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4. Fossati (2016) also estimates the factor from a larger scale DFM modeled after
Stock and Watson (2002), and he finds in his out-of-sample exercise that the factor
from the large-scale DFM performs better in forecasting recessions than the factor 
from the small-scale DFM. In this note, we did not compare the performance of
the ADS index with the performance of the factor from a larger-scale DFM. 
5. How negative should the ADS be in order to signal a recession? Berge and Jordà 
(2011) show that the level of the ADS index that maximizes the ROC when 
NBER recessions are the target is about −0.8017 (using the last vintage available 
to them and stopping the computation in December 2007). 
6. See Estrella and Hardouvelis (1991) and Estrella and Mishkin (1998) for a thor-
ough account of the earlier literature that links the term spread and real activ-
ity. More recently, papers that focus on the predictive power of the slope of the
yield curve for recessions include Benzoni, Chyruk, and Kelley (2018); Chauvet
and Potter (2005); Croushore and Marsten (2016); Kauppi and Saikkonen (2008);
Rudebusch and Williams (2009); and Wright (2006). 
7. Notice that the slope of the yield curve does not even need to be negative to obtain 
considerable spikes in the estimated probability. 
8. See https://www.clevelandfed.org/our-research/indicators-and-data/yield-curve 
-and-gdp-growth.aspx. 
9. Wright (2006) explores both the nominal federal funds rate and the real rate (for
which inflation expectations are proxied by a four-quarter backward-looking mov-
ing average of the core personal consumption expenditures [PCE] price index). 
10. Updated data on the EBP can be found in Favara et al. (2016b). 
11. As in Berge (2015), we use the package BMA in R by Raftery et al. (2018) in order 
to reduce the dimensionality of the problem. 
12. We exclude quarterly GDP, as the model is monthly. 
13. Heat maps for the other models are available upon request from the authors. 
14. An ROC curve illustrates the trade-off associated with achieving a particular true
positive rate versus the corresponding false positive rate. The area under the ROC
curve (AUC) is a summary statistic measuring the classification ability of an indi-
cator/model. The higher the AUC, the better the classification ability. 
15. The only noise in this measure would be term premiums or liquidity premiums
embedded in shorter-term Treasury rates. 
16. See https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/nfci/. 
17. The progressive sophistication of available dictionaries for textual analysis will
make it possible to sift through finer details in texts, which will circumvent these
limitations. 
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Rising Policy Uncertainty 
Steven J. Davis 
University of Chicago 
Figure 6.1 displays a monthly index of economic policy uncer-
tainty (EPU) for the United States that I developed with Scott Baker 
and Nick Bloom.1 In constructing this index, we aim to capture uncer-
tainty about who will make economic policy decisions, what economic 
policy actions will be undertaken and when, and the economic effects 
of policy actions (or inaction)—including uncertainties related to the 
economic ramifications of “noneconomic” policy matters, e.g., military 
actions. To do so, we first count articles in 10 leading U.S. newspapers 
that contain the following triple of terms: 1) “economic” or “economy”;
2) “uncertain” or “uncertainty”; and 3) one or more of “Congress,” “def-
icit,” “Federal Reserve,” “legislation,” “regulation,” or “White House.” 
Next, we divide the raw EPU count by the number of all articles in the 
same paper and month, standardize the variability of the scaled EPU 
counts, and average over newspapers by month. Finally, we normalize 
the mean index value to 100 from 1985 to 2009. Thus, the index value 
of 284 in January 2019 is 2.84 times its 1985–2009 average. 
Our U.S. EPU index spikes near tight presidential elections, Gulf 
Wars I and II, the 9/11 attacks, major fiscal policy battles from 2011 
to 2013, and in reaction to the June 2016 Brexit referendum, Donald 
Trump’s surprise election victory in November 2016, and escalating 
trade policy tensions in 2018 and 2019. The EPU index tends to rise 
in recessions, but many of the largest spikes and highest index values 
occur during the long, ongoing expansion that began in the second half 
of 2009. Measures of policy uncertainty derived from textual analysis 
of the Federal Reserve System’s periodic Beige Books and from tran-
scripts of quarterly earnings conference calls of publicly listed firms 
exhibit similar time-series patterns.2 Baker et al. (2014) present and dis-
cuss evidence that policy-related economic uncertainty in the United 
81 
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Figure 6.1  U.S. Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, 1985 to July 2019 
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SOURCE: Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), as updated at PolicyUncertainty.com. 
States followed an upward trajectory in the 1960s and 1970s, stabilized 
somewhat in the 1980s and 1990s, and rose again after the late 1990s. 
Using the same approach, we and others construct monthly news-
paper-based EPU indices for 20 additional countries: Australia, Bra-
zil, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, France, Germany, Greece, India, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Russia, South Korea, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.3 We rely on own-country 
newspapers in constructing the national EPU indices and perform all 
searches in the language of the newspaper. To help develop suitable E, 
P, and U term sets, we consulted persons with native fluency and eco-
nomics expertise in the relevant language and country. Our P term set 
differs across countries for reasons both obvious (e.g., using “BOJ” for 
Japan) and idiosyncratic (e.g., inclusion of “customs duties” for India). 
Monthly data for all 21 national EPU indices are available and regularly 
updated at www.PolicyUncertainty.com. 
To construct an index of global economic policy uncertainty, I pro-
ceed as follows in Davis (2016): First, I renormalize each national EPU 
index to a mean of 100 from 1997 (or first year) to 2015. Second, I 
impute missing values for certain countries using a regression-based 
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ues for 21 countries from January 1997 to the present. Third, I com-
pute the global EPU index value for each month as the GDP-weighted 
average of the 21 national EPU index values, using GDP data from the 
IMF’s World Economic Outlook Database. Figure 6.2 plots the result-
ing index. 
The global EPU index rises sharply in reaction to the Asian and 
Russian financial crises, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the U.S.-led invasion 
of Iraq in 2003, the global financial crisis in 2008–2009, the European 
immigration crisis in 2015, and several other developments.5 It fluctu-
ates around consistently high levels from mid-2011 to early 2013, a 
period characterized by recurring sovereign debt and banking crises in 
the Eurozone, intense battles over fiscal and health-care policies in the 
United States, and a generational leadership transition in China. Seven 
of nine members on the Standing Committee, China’s most powerful 
decision-making body, were slated for retirement in 2012. Other senior 
leadership bodies in China experienced similarly high turnover rates 
because of retirement, leading Li (2011) to characterize 2012 as the 
fourth “generational transfer of power” in the history of Communist 
Figure 6.2  Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, January 1997 to 
July 2019 
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China. Two previous generational transitions coincided with tragedy 
and turmoil in the form of the Cultural Revolution and the 1989 Tianan-
men Square protests and massacre. 
Eurozone developments in the period from mid-2011 to early 2013 
include a rescue package for Portugal in May 2011, a bailout pack-
age for Greece in July 2011 (amid widespread speculation that Greece 
would leave the Eurozone), large yield increases on Spanish and Italian 
government bonds in August 2011, April 2012, and June 2012, a May 
2012 election in which most Greek voters rejected a proposed bailout 
agreement, and multiple extraordinary actions by the European Central 
Bank in response to these and other developments. 
Across the Atlantic, bitterly partisan disputes over the direction 
of U.S. fiscal policy led to a “debt ceiling” fight in summer 2011 that 
threatened to curtail critical government functions and delay payments 
on U.S. Treasury securities, and an extraordinary “fiscal cliff” episode 
with last-minute resolutions of major uncertainties about tax and spend-
ing policies. Uncertainties surrounding U.S. health-care policy were 
also extraordinarily high in this period. For example, an appellate court 
struck down the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) in August 2011, 
concluding that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to require 
individuals to purchase health insurance or pay a penalty, and threaten-
ing the viability of the entire act (Cooper 2011). The issue remained 
unsettled until June 2012, when the Supreme Court reversed the appel-
late court in a surprise, closely divided decision (Bravin and Radnofsky 
2012). 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its military incursions in 
eastern Ukraine led to international sanctions and an uncertain environ-
ment that curtailed foreign investment in Russia and contributed to its 
weak economic performance (European Parliamentary Research Ser-
vice 2016). The Russia-Ukraine conflict and its unsettled nature harmed 
the Ukrainian economy as well and deterred foreign investment there 
(Morelli 2016). China’s aggressive pursuit of sovereignty claims in 
the South China Sea has raised concerns about threats to ship-borne 
trade in some of the world’s busiest international waters (Schonhardt 
and Chaturvedi 2016). Recent geopolitical tensions in the Persian Gulf, 
U.S.-led economic sanctions on Iran, and the Iranian seizure of oil tank-
ers in the Strait of Hormuz have renewed concerns about petroleum 
supplies (Rachman 2019). 
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Syria has been the epicenter of a many-sided military conflict and 
humanitarian catastrophe since 2011, with devastating consequences 
and highly uncertain long-term implications. The catastrophe produced 
a flood of migrants into neighboring countries and Europe in 2014 and 
2015, stoking security fears, creating anxiety about social and eco-
nomic consequences, and placing enormous strains on the Schengen 
Area arrangements for free mobility in a borderless Europe (Baker, 
Bloom, and Davis 2015; BBC News 2016; Dustmann et al. 2016; Halla, 
Wagner, and Zweimüller 2015). 
Several major political and policy developments have rocked 
national economies and the global economic outlook since 2016. 
Leading examples include the June 2016 Brexit referendum, Donald 
Trump’s upset electoral win in November of that year, and the strength 
of populist political movements in several European countries. These 
developments have injected new sources of political and economic 
uncertainties into the global economy. 
There are many other recent examples of economic uncertainty 
emanating from political developments. In South Korea, political scan-
dal led to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in December 
2016 and her removal from office in March 2017. In Brazil, a long 
and severe recession, an extraordinary wave of corruption investiga-
tions, the criminal convictions of many leading political figures, and the 
impeachment and removal of President Dilma Rousseff in 2016 com-
bined to upend the political landscape. Brazil’s new president, Michel 
Temer, has promised to restore growth by reversing several major poli-
cies of his predecessor (Economist 2016). In Argentina, new fears that 
the Peronist party would regain political power in upcoming elections 
triggered a spectacular 15 percent depreciation of the Argentine peso on 
August 12, 2019, and a 38 percent plunge in the stock market the same 
day (Dube and Lewis 2019a,b; Mander 2019). 
In Turkey, after squashing an attempted coup d’état in July 2016, 
the government set about arresting and firing more than 100,000 
teachers, military officers, judges, mayors, civil servants, and others 
(Arango, Yeginsu, and Timur 2016; Yeginsu 2016). Ten weeks after the 
failed coup, Moody’s Investor Service downgraded Turkey’s sovereign 
credit rating, citing external funding risks, slowing growth, and “further 
concerns regarding the predictability and effectiveness of government 




aftermath have also strained international relations between Turkey and 
several of its allies (Birnbaum and DeYoung 2016). Intense pressures 
on the foreign exchange value of the Turkish lira have prompted dra-
matic policy moves by the Turkish Central Bank since 2018 and the 
dismissal of the bank’s governor in July 2019 (Coskun 2019; Gauthier-
Villars and Sindreu 2018; and Kantchev and Hannon 2019). 
THE NEW PROMINENCE OF TRADE POLICY
UNCERTAINTY 
Trade policy has become both more uncertain and more protection-
ist under the Trump presidency. Particulars include the U.S. withdrawal 
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement in January 2017, 
President Trump’s early threats to jettison the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), doubts about U.S. congressional ratifica-
tion of a NAFTA-replacement treaty, and a large number of tariff hikes, 
tariff threats, and tariff reversals. The average U.S. tariff rate rose from 
less than 2 percent in December 2017 to 4 percent in May 2019. It was 
slated to reach an estimated 5–8 percent by the end of 2019.6 Threats 
of additional tariff hikes would have, if fully implemented, brought 
the average U.S. tariff rate to an estimated 9–11 percent by the end of 
2019.7 The trade-weighted average U.S. tariff on Chinese imports rose 
from 3.1 percent in 2017 to 12.4 percent in 2018 and 18.3 percent in 
May 2019. Current U.S. plans would take the average U.S. tariff rate 
on Chinese imports to an estimated 21.4 percent in December 2019 
(Brown and Zhang 2019). 
U.S. tariff hikes and President Trump’s rhetorical attacks on trad-
ing partners invite retaliation. Indeed, tit-for-tat tariff hikes between the 
United States and China have been underway since April 2018. Canada, 
India, Mexico, Turkey, and the European Union have also imposed new 
tariffs on American imports in reaction to U.S. tariff hikes. In short, the 
shift to greater protectionism in U.S. trade policy has prompted other 
countries to respond in kind. 
Trump administration officials often assert that the administration’s 
aggressive trade policy stance will yield new trade deals that are more 
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for this assertion. The U.S. and South Korea renegotiated and signed 
a revised Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in September 2018, but 
the new agreement involves “only limited changes to the original pact” 
(Schott and Jung 2018). On November 30, 2018, Canadian Prime Min-
ister Trudeau, Mexican President Peña Nieto, and U.S. President Trump 
signed the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) to replace 
NAFTA. For months its ratification seemed unlikely; however, it was 
finally ratified by the U.S. Congress in January of this year.8 The tone of 
recent statements from the U.S. and Chinese sides suggests dim pros-
pects in the next few months for a significant resolution of outstanding 
trade policy conflicts and a reversal of recent tariff hikes. Nor is there 
any sign that the United States will soon resolve its trade policy con-
flicts with India, Turkey, or the European Union. 
Trade policy under the Trump administration also has a capricious, 
back-and-forth character that amplifies uncertainty and undermines a 
rules-based trading order. Less than three months after withdrawing 
from the TPP, President Trump said he would consider rejoining for a 
substantially better deal, only to throw cold water on the idea a few days 
later (Trump 2018; Ungku and Greenfield 2018). Robert Lighthizer, the 
U.S. trade representative, justified steel tariffs on the laughable grounds 
that Canada, for example, presents a national security threat (Press 
2018). But President Trump tweeted that tariffs on Canadian steel 
were really a response to Canadian tariffs on U.S. dairy products (Byrd 
2018). In August 2018, the president, for reasons unclear, tweeted that 
he had “just authorized a doubling of Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum 
with respect to Turkey” (Ballhaus and Schlesinger 2018). 
Under President Trump, tariffs are threatened, announced, delayed, 
reversed, announced again, imposed, and removed—often in quick suc-
cession. Some countries get tariff exemptions, some don’t. Exemptions 
vary in duration, and they come and go in a head-spinning manner. 
The recent treatment of steel imports exemplifies this aspect of U.S. 
trade policy under President Trump. See Brown and Kolb (2019) for a 
detailed account. 
Another example involves the latest round of announcements about 
new tariffs on Chinese imports, which Kubota (2019) summarizes this 
way: “On Aug. 1, President Trump abruptly announced on Twitter that 
he would impose on Sept. 1 a 10 percent levy on roughly $300 billion 





failure to commit to promised U.S. agricultural purchases.” Less than 
two weeks later, the plan was revised to “impose 10 percent tariffs on 
$112 billion of Chinese imports starting on September 1 . . . followed 
by a second round of duties on a different set of products, covering 
$160 billion of imports, on December 15” (Brown 2019, p. 1). China 
retaliated on August 23, announcing plans to levy new tariffs of 5 to 
10 percent on $75 billion in U.S. imports. President Trump responded 
later the same day, announcing that he would raise existing and planned 
tariffs on $550 billon of Chinese imports by an additional 5 percentage 
points (Mauldin, Leary, and Deng 2019). 
Trump administration trade policy also gives greater discretion 
over tariffs to bureaucrats, creating added complexity and uncertainty 
for individual businesses and compelling them, as a matter of busi-
ness necessity, to become enmeshed in the tariff-exemption process. 
For example, the Department of Commerce rolled out a slow-working, 
burdensome process for requesting company-specific exemptions from 
steel and aluminum tariffs, as neatly recounted in the Wall Street Jour-
nal (Wall Street Journal Editorial Board 2018): 
Companies must submit a request attesting that their imports aren’t 
made in the U.S. in “a satisfactory quality” or “sufficient and rea-
sonably available amount.” Companies must state the uses for their 
steel product, their average annual consumption of the product, as 
well as the number of days required to take delivery, manufacture 
and ship the product. They must also estimate the maximum and 
minimum composition of 24 chemical elements in their products 
including molybdenum, antimony and vanadium. There are doz-
ens of other queries, but we’ll spare you.
Oh, and a separate request is required for each width, length, grade 
shape, and form of steel or aluminum product. A single company, 
Primrose Alloys, has submitted more than 1,200 steel product 
requests, according to Commerce’s database. All 14 that have been 
reviewed so far were denied. 
Businesses may also submit statements to support their requests, 
which naturally turn political…. 
These various developments have led to a tremendous upsurge in 
anxiety and uncertainty about trade policy and its economic fallout. To 
attach some numbers to this point, Figure 6.3 displays a newspaper-
based index of trade policy uncertainty (TPU) for the United States. 
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NOTE: Monthly data normalized to 100 from 1985 to 2009. 
SOURCE: Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), as updated at PolicyUncertainty.com. 
The TPU index reflects the frequency of articles in U.S. newspapers 
that discuss economic policy uncertainty and trade policy matters. 
Two periods stand out. The first runs from August 1992 to March 
1995 and reflects uncertainties around the negotiation, ratification, 
and implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). The second commences with Donald Trump’s election vic-
tory in November 2016. The TPU index rose above 300 in reaction to 
the election outcome, the U.S. withdrawal from the TPP Agreement in 
January 2017, and U.S. tariffs on steel and aluminum imports imposed 
in March 2018. It rose even higher later in 2018 and in 2019, as U.S.-
China trade policy conflicts intensified. The TPU index value averaged 
301 from March 2018 to July 2019—7.7 times its average from 2013 to 
2015 and 5.3 times its average from 1996 to 2015. 
Table 6.1 presents evidence on the new prominence of trade policy 
uncertainty in China and Japan as well as the United States. Like Figure 
6.3, Table 6.1 relies on frequency counts of own-country newspaper 
articles about trade policy uncertainty, but the scaling is different. In 
Figure 6.3, the raw TPU counts are scaled by the count of all articles in 






Table 6.1  Trade Policy Share of EPU Articles, Selected Time Periods for
Three Major Economies 
Time period United States Japan China 
1987–2015 4 8 16 
2000–2015 2 7 20 
NAFTA: Jan. 1992 to Dec. 2002 11 11 10 
China WTO Accession: Jan. 2000 to 3 5 36 
Dec. 2002 
November 2016 to December 2018 15 27 48 
March–December 2018 15 29 48 
January–July 2019 12 29 42 
NOTE: Table entries report the percentage of articles about economic policy uncertainty 
that discuss trade policy matters in leading newspapers for the indicated countries. 
SOURCE: Tabulated from data developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) for the 
United States, Arbatli et al. (2019) for Japan, and Davis, Liu, and Sheng (2019) for 
China. 
trast, Table 6.1 reports the percentage of EPU articles that discuss trade 
policy matters. All three countries show a dramatic rise in this percent-
age since November 2016, even more so since March 2018. Consider, 
for example, a comparison of the 2000–2015 period to the period from 
March to December in 2018: the trade policy share of EPU articles rose 
from 2 to 15 percent in the United States, from 7 to 27 percent in Japan, 
and from 20 to 48 percent in China. These comparisons support two 
conclusions: first, the rise in trade policy uncertainty under the Trump 
presidency has reverberated globally; second, the level of anxiety about 
trade policy is higher for major U.S. trading partners. 
Trade policy concerns have also become a major source of stock 
market gyrations since 2018. For example, the S&P 500 index fell more 
than 2.5 percent on March 22, 2018, reacting to news about new U.S. 
tariffs on tens of billions of dollars of Chinese imports. Four days later, 
the index rose more than 2.7 percent on news that the U.S. and China 
had begun trade negotiations. Nevertheless, tariffs and tariff threats 
between the two countries have ratcheted upward in the ensuing 15 
months. 
In Baker, Bloom, Davis, and Sammon (2019), my coauthors and I 
examine the role of trade policy developments and 15 other news cate-
gories in large daily stock market moves. We first identified every daily 
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move of more than 2.5 percent, up or down, in the U.S. stock market. 
By this criterion, there were 1,114 large daily moves from January 1900 
to July 2019. For each large move, we read next-day news articles in the 
Wall Street Journal to classify perceptions of what moves the market. 
Table 6.2 summarizes our evidence regarding the role of trade pol-
icy as a trigger for large daily moves in the U.S. stock market. The 
Journal attributed 7 of 1,103 large moves from 1900 to February 2018 
mainly to news about trade policy, as compared to 4 of 11 large moves 
from March 2018 to July 2019.9 By this metric, the prominent role of 
trade policy in recent U.S. stock market swings is historically unprec-
edented. In a complementary analysis, Huang et al. (2018) examine 
firm-level equity returns from March 21 to March 23. They find larger 
negative returns for U.S.-listed firms having greater exposure to trade 
with China over this period and larger negative returns for Chinese-
listed firms with greater sales to the United States. 
In Baker, Bloom, Davis, and Sammon (2019), my coauthors and I 
take a different approach to the analysis of newspaper content. We first 
use automated methods to identify articles about stock market volatil-
ity in 11 leading U.S. newspapers and to construct an “equity market 
volatility” (EMV) tracker. Our newspaper-based EMV tracker performs 
well in the sense that it moves closely with actual stock market volatil-
ity. Parsing the text in the EMV articles, we then quantify journalists’
perceptions of what drives volatility in equity returns and classify the 
drivers into about 30 categories, many of which pertain to particular 
Table 6.2  Trade Policy News Jolted the U.S. Stock Market in 2018 and 
2019 
Number of daily 
stock market jumps Number attributed Percent 
greater than 2.5% to trade policy news (%) 
January 1900 to 1,103 7 0.6 
February 2018 
March 2018 to 11 4 35.7 
July 2019 
NOTE: Table reports total number of jumps, up or down, in the indicated time peri-
ods and the number attributed primarily to news about trade policy, according to the 
human readings. 




types of policy. This approach lets us assess the importance of each cat-
egory to the average level of stock market volatility and its movements 
over time. 
As seen in Figure 6.4, trade policy gets attention in 26 percent of 
articles about equity market volatility in leading U.S. newspapers from 
March to December 2018. In glaring contrast, trade policy matters 
receive attention in a mere 2.7 percent of articles about equity market 
volatility from 1985 to 2015.10 In other words, trade policy went from 
a virtual nonfactor in U.S. equity market volatility in recent decades to 
one of its leading sources in 2018. 
THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN POLICY UNCERTAINTY AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Politics and policy decision-making are often messy and fraught 
with uncertainty about political outcomes, policy decisions, near-term 
consequences, and long-term implications. The previous two sections 
offer a variety of examples, many of them recent, drawn from countries 
around the world. They include the U.S. debt-ceiling crisis in August 
2011, the U.S. fiscal cliff and government shutdown episodes in 2012 
and 2013, the Syrian catastrophe, multiple Eurozone crises since 2010, 
Russian military incursions in Ukraine, the European immigration crisis, 
the ongoing Brexit saga, a coup attempt and crackdown in Turkey, the 
removal of South Korea’s president, corruption scandals and presiden-
tial removal in Brazil, a sharp escalation of U.S.-China trade policy con-
flicts in 2018 and 2019, and more. These examples illustrate the role of 
governments and political processes as sources of economic uncertainty. 
That uncertainty weighs negatively on economic performance. At least 
in a proximate sense, causality runs from political processes and policy 
uncertainty to aggregate economic performance in these examples. 
Economic developments also give rise to uncertainty, directly and 
through their impact on policy making. As a leading example, the global 
financial crisis of 2007–2009 confronted policymakers with extraordi-
nary and complex challenges, especially in the immediate wake of the 
financial panic in September 2008. There was great uncertainty about 
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Figure 6.4 Percent of Articles about Equity Market Volatility in Leading 
U.S. Newspapers That Discuss Trade Policy Matters, 1985 to 
2018 
40 NAFTA Negotiations, Agreement, 
Ratification and Introduction; January 
Tariff Hikes, Trade Tensions, March-– 
December 2018; Mean: 26.0% 
NOTE: Computed from automated readings of newspaper articles about equity market 
volatility and (equity market volatility + trade policy) in 11 major newspapers. 
SOURCE: Baker, Bloom, Davis, and Kost (2019). 
economic consequences. In this episode, the financial crisis and its 
economic fallout drove a sharp rise in policy uncertainty. In turn, high 
policy uncertainty contributed to the severity of the crisis and the weak-
ness of the ensuing recovery. 
There is also evidence that major financial crises lead to higher 
levels of policy uncertainty for many years. Funke, Schularick, and 
Trebesch (2016) draw on data for many countries over 140 years to 
document a pattern of rising political polarization in the years following 
systemic financial crises, contributing to higher levels of policy uncer-
tainty. Mian, Sufi, and Trebbi (2014) also find evidence that financial 
crises breed political polarization, which sometimes results in political 
gridlock and policy uncertainty. 
A key point: the potential for negative shocks to drive policy uncer-
tainty depends on the underlying environment, which is partly shaped by 
past policy decisions.11 Consider again the global financial crisis. It was 
precipitated by a collapse in U.S. housing prices and mortgage-backed 
security values (Mian and Sufi 2014). The shock was large, and many 
banks were highly exposed to it. The shock led to a systemic financial 
crisis, because banks were poorly capitalized and heavily dependent on 
 
94 Davis 
flight-prone forms of debt to fund their investments. If policymakers 
had required banks to rely more heavily on run-proof funding, the crisis 
would have been less severe—and perhaps would have been avoided 
altogether. In this and other respects, the precrisis regulatory regime set 
the stage for a major financial crisis (Admati and Hellwig 2013; Duffie 
2019) and the ensuing policy uncertainty. 
As another example, there is less need for discretionary fiscal stim-
ulus in response to negative shocks when robust automatic fiscal stabi-
lizers are in place. Automatic fiscal stabilizers lessen the political con-
flicts, decision delays, implementation lags, and policy uncertainty that 
come with efforts to deploy discretionary fiscal tools. Especially when 
monetary policy is hampered by an effective lower bound on policy 
rates, inadequate or poorly designed automatic fiscal stabilizers practi-
cally ensure that political leaders will turn to discretionary fiscal policy 
as a response to the next large economic downturn. 
High policy uncertainty in the past decade has stimulated empiri-
cal research on its economic consequences. Durnev (2012), Giavazzi 
and McMahon (2012), Julio and Yook (2012, 2016), and Kelly, Pas-
tor, and Veronesi (2016), among others, investigate the effects of elec-
tion-related uncertainty on corporate investment, international capital 
flows, precautionary savings, and stock price volatility. By and large, 
this literature finds that election-related uncertainty reduces invest-
ment, discourages inward foreign direct investment (FDI), raises pre-
cautionary savings, and increases stock price volatility. Aaberge, Liu, 
and Zhu (2017) find that political uncertainty associated with the 1989 
Tiananmen Square movement led to sharp savings increases by Chi-
nese households. Wiemann and Lumsdaine (2019) find that increases 
in uncertainty about U.S. health-care policy lowers the consumption 
spending of married households, more so for those with worse health. 
Handley and Limão (2015) develop evidence that lower uncertainty 
about trade policy stimulates investment in export capacity. Caldara et 
al. (2019) find evidence that higher trade policy uncertainty since 2017 
has dampened U.S. business investment.12 Gulen and Ion (2016) find 
negative effects of policy uncertainty on corporate investment using the 
U.S. EPU measure in Figure 6.1. Similarly, Baker, Bloom, and Davis 
(2016) find larger negative effects of EPU on investment rates and 
employment growth, and larger positive effects on stock price volatil-
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use transcripts of earnings conference calls to construct time-varying 
measures of firm-level policy uncertainty. They also find that higher 
uncertainty discourages investment and employment. Using the EPU 
index for India, Anand and Tulin (2014) find negative effects of policy 
uncertainty on firm-level investment flows, with stronger effects on 
new projects. 
A larger literature considers the effects of economic uncertainty in 
general, rather than policy uncertainty in particular. Important early anal-
yses of how income uncertainty affects consumption behavior include 
Carroll (1997), Kimball (1990), and Zeldes (1989). Eberly (1994) finds 
that high uncertainty leads households to defer costly-to-reverse pur-
chases of durable goods. Bloom (2009) finds that high uncertainty leads 
firms to cut or delay investment expenditures. These two studies and 
many others stress that heightened uncertainty provides an incentive 
to delay or forgo investments that are costly to reverse. Uncertainty 
can also depress investment by raising risk premiums, as stressed by
Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2016); Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno 
(2014); Gilchrist, Sim, and Zakrajšek (2014); and Pastor and Veronesi 
(2013). Insofar as high uncertainty depresses investment and discour-
ages the reallocation of capital and labor, it also slows the growth of 
productivity and output. See Bloom (2014) for a fuller discussion of 
how uncertainty affects economic activity. 
Another branch of the literature investigates the dynamic relation-
ship of policy uncertainty, or economic uncertainty more broadly, to 
macroeconomic performance. Examples include Arbatli et al. (2019); 
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016); Baker, Bloom, and Terry (2016); 
Colombo (2013); Ghirelli, Pérez, and Urtasun (2019); International 
Monetary Fund (2013); Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015); Leduc and 
Liu (2016); and Stock and Watson (2012). These studies typically find 
that higher (policy) uncertainty foreshadows a deterioration in macro-
economic performance. Romer (1990) marshals evidence that the 1929 
stock market crash triggered a sharp rise in income uncertainty that led 
households to forgo purchases of consumer durables, accentuating the 
collapse of aggregate demand at the onset of the Great Depression. Evi-
dence in Constantinescu, Mattoo, and Ruta (2017) suggests that high 
policy uncertainty depresses international trade in goods and services. 
In summary, a variety of studies find evidence that high policy 






to delay or forgo investments and hiring, by slowing productivity-
enhancing factor reallocation, and by depressing consumption expen-
ditures. This evidence points to a positive payoff in the form of stron-
ger macroeconomic performance if policymakers can deliver greater 
predictability in the policy environment. A smaller literature finds that 
greater uncertainty causes households and firms to become less respon-
sive on the margin to cuts in interest rates and taxes, in line with pre-
dictions of real options theory. See Aastveit, Natvik, and Sola (2013); 
Bertola, Guiso, and Pistaferri (2005); Bloom (2009); Bloom, Bond, 
and Van Reenen (2007); and Vavra (2014). These studies suggest that a 
stronger policy framework also increases the potency of countercycli-
cal stabilization policies. 
CONCLUSION 
U.S. and global policy uncertainty have been highly elevated 
in recent years. According to Figure 6.1 and evidence in Baker et al. 
(2014), the past dozen years have seen the highest levels of U.S. eco-
nomic policy uncertainty in the past 60 years. According to Figure 6.2, 
global EPU in 2017 and 2018 is running at even higher levels than dur-
ing the global financial crisis. The huge rise in trade policy uncertainty 
since early 2018 is an extraordinary departure from recent history, as is 
the prominent role of trade policy in recent stock market volatility. 
There is now a sizable body of empirical research that supports the 
proposition that high policy uncertainty harms macroeconomic per-
formance. The evidence in this literature implies that greater predict-
ability in the policy environment yields better macroeconomic perfor-
mance. A smaller literature suggests that standard monetary and fiscal 
policy tools are also more effective in environments with greater policy 
predictability. 
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Notes 
This chapter, prepared in connection with the Werner Sichel Lecture Series at Western 
Michigan University, draws on my research with Scott Baker, Nick Bloom, and others 
in Arbatli et al. (2019); Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016); Baker, Bloom, Davis, and 
Kost (2019); Baker, Bloom, Davis, and Sammon (2019); Davis (2016); and Davis, Liu, 
and Sheng (2019). I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the U.S. National 
Science Foundation and the Booth School of Business at the University of Chicago. 
1. See Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016). Monthly updates are available at www.Policy
Uncertainty.com. 
2. See Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016) on Beige Books and Hassan et al. (2019) on 
earnings calls. 
3. See Cerda, Silva, and Valente (2016) on the EPU index for Chile; Baker, Bloom, 
Davis, and Wang (2013) for China; Gil and Silva (2018) for Colombia; Hardouve-
lis et al. (2018) for Greece; Zalla (2016) for Ireland; Arbatli et al. (2019) for Japan; 
Kroese, Kok, and Parlevliet (2015) for the Netherlands; Ghirelli, Pérez, and Urta-
sun (2019) for Spain; and Armelius, Hull, and Köhler (2017) for Sweden. EPU 
data for the other countries are updates to the indices developed in Baker, Bloom, 
and Davis (2016) and new indices that we developed using the same methods. 
4. For example, I regress the EPU index for Australia from 1998 onward on con-
temporaneous EPU index values for all countries with no missing data. I then use 
predicted values from this regression to impute the missing Australian values for 
1997. 
5. Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) present and discuss a suite of newspaper-based 
indices of immigration-related fears and policy uncertainty for France, Germany, 
the United Kingdom, and the United States. Updates are available at http://www
.policyuncertainty.com/immigration_fear.html. 
6. I am unaware of authoritative, up-to-the-moment statistics on average U.S. tariff 
rates. Statistics cited in the text are a composite of estimates attributed to Deutsche 
Bank and UBS Group in Douglas (2019) and a chart attributed to Oxford Econom-
ics in Borodovsky (2019). 
7. These figures are also estimates reported in Borodovsky (2019) and Douglas 
(2019). They do not incorporate President Trump’s announcement on August 23, 
2019, of additional tariff hikes on Chinese imports. 
8. In August 2019, PredictIt assessed only a 30 percent probability that “both houses 
of the U.S. Congress shall ratify the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement, by 
passing a bill to implement such agreement” by the end of 2019. See also Marcos 
(2019) and Werner, Lynch, and Rauhala (2019). However, the House ratified it that 
December, and the Senate followed suit on January 16 of this year. 
9. The four dates and the corresponding value-weighted returns on the S&P 500 are 
March 22, 2018, −2.52 percent; March 26, 2018, 2.72 percent; December 4, 2018, 
−3.24 percent; and January 4, 2019, 3.43 percent. 











contain trade policy terms)/(count of all EMV articles) in each month from Janu-
ary 1985 to December 2018. The “count of all EMV articles” in the denominator 
is the number of articles in 11 leading U.S. newspapers that contain at least one 
term in each of the following three sets: (E)conomy: {economic, economy, finan-
cial}; Stock (M)arket: {stock market, equity, equities, Standard and Poors, Stan-
dard & Poors, Standard and Poor, Standard and Poor’s, Standard & Poor’s}; and
(V)olatility: {uncertain, uncertainty, volatility, volatile, risk, risky}. The numera-
tor is the count of the subset of EMV articles that also contain one or more terms 
in Trade Policy: {trade policy, tariff, import duty, import barrier, import restric-
tion, trade quota, dumping, export tax, export duty, trade treaty, trade agreement, 
trade act, WTO, World Trade Organization, Doha round, Uruguay round, GATT, 
export restriction, investment restriction, NAFTA, North American Free Trade 
Agreement, Trans-Pacific Partnership, TransPacific Partnership, Federal Mari-
time Commission, International Trade Commission, Jones Act, trade adjustment 
assistance}. 
11. The effects of policy uncertainty also depend on the environment. For example, 
Basu and Bundick (2017) and Nakata (2017) examine uncertainty shocks in New 
Keynesian models. Both papers conclude that higher uncertainty has a larger neg-
ative effect on output when the monetary authority’s policy rate is closer to the 
zero bound. Caggiano, Castelnuovo, and Pellegrino (2017) find empirical support 
for this prediction. 
12. Although they cannot cleanly disentangle uncertainty effects from (negative) 
anticipation effects, Altig et al. (2019) report survey evidence that trade policy 
developments in 2018 caused a small drop in U.S. business investment. Similarly, 
Bloom et al. (2019) find survey evidence that Brexit-related developments have 
caused a sizable drop in U.K. business investment over the past three years. 
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Measuring Economies from Space 
Adam Storeygard 
Tufts University 
Why do we use satellite data for economic research and policymak-
ing? Satellite data have several features that help us answer the kinds 
of causal questions about economic phenomena, and the effects of poli-
cies, that we care about as economists and policymakers. In particular, 
there are six advantages that I see as key. In this chapter, I address each 
one in turn, highlighting one or two pieces of economics research that 
use each and what we can learn from them. This chapter deals with data 
and methods, but throughout I’ll show how they’ve been used to gener-
ate some very concrete lessons that are relevant to policy.1 
SIX ADVANTAGES OF SATELLITE DATA 
The first advantage of satellite data is that they exist where other 
data do not. Collecting data via household surveys and censuses is 
expensive and can be logistically difficult, especially in poor countries. 
The same is true of many kinds of administrative data that rich coun-
tries regularly collect. 
To take an extreme example, Lee (2018) uses satellite data on lights 
at night from North Korea, a country that essentially does not publish 
credible economic data, to study the effect of sanctions there. Relying 
on the fact that changes in lighting are correlated with changes in eco-
nomic activity, as demonstrated by Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil 
(2012), Lee uses the lights data to show that sanctions pushed economic 
activity toward Pyongyang (Figure 7.1) and to cities where trade with 
China was concentrated. China was not part of the sanctions regime. 
He argues that instead of primarily punishing ruling elites, as intended, 
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Figure 7.1  Lights Near Pyongyang, North Korea, in 1992, 2002, and 2012 
SOURCE: Lee (2018). 
sanctions thus likely had their largest impacts on the “already marginal-
ized hinterlands” (Lee 2018, p. 34). 
A lack of data, of course, affects many places other than North 
Korea, in less extreme ways. In my work focused on how African cit-
ies grow, I have used the same night lights data as a measure of city-
level economic activity, because other sources are rarely available, and 
almost never for every year. The paper by Henderson, Storeygard, and 
Deichmann (2017) considers how a drying climate throughout much of 
sub-Saharan Africa over a 50-year period (Figure 7.2) affected cities. 
The authors demonstrate that a drying climate appears to have pushed 
economic activity into some African cities but not others. Consistent 
with a simple theory, it is the cities most likely to have a preexisting 
export manufacturing base that attract new activity in times of drought, 
while cities that are more local in orientation are not affected. In the the-
ory, the manufacturing-oriented cities are less affected by the drought 
because it affects neither their production technology nor the demand 
for their products. The more locally oriented cities, however, face a 
drop in demand from their customers: local farmers, whose production 
and therefore income fall. 
These lights data have been used to address many other questions 
in data-poor environments, including how transport costs affect Afri-
can cities (Storeygard 2016) and the effects of refugee camps on local 
economies in Kenya (Alix-Garcia et al. 2018). 
A second advantage is that satellite data are often collected at 
extremely high spatial resolution, sometimes now less than one square 
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Figure 7.2  Moisture Change in Africa, from the Period of 1950–1969 to 




















































SOURCE: Henderson, Storeygard, and Deichmann (2017). 
meter. Jayachandran et al. (2017) have used this feature to evaluate a 
program of payments for ecosystem services in rural Uganda. The pro-
gram paid private forest owners not to cut down trees for up to two 
years. The satellite data are fine enough that one can detect individual 
trees and assign them to the land of an individual household. Figure 7.3 
shows what happened in four particular sample locations, each corre-
sponding to a row in the figure. The first two columns of images show 
trees at the beginning and end of the two-year period, and the last col-
umn shows changes in tree cover. The authors link these data with a 
household survey about the program, using the location of each house-
hold’s land. This link is of course critical—very little social science can 
be done with remote data alone. The authors found that people who 
were randomly assigned to the payments group cut down substantially 
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Figure 7.3  Changes in Forest Cover on Four Plots in Uganda 
Time 1 Time 2  Change Map 
Cloud 
Other land cover 
Persistent tree cover 
Tree cover decrease 
Tree cover increase 
SOURCE: Jayachandran et al. (2017). Reprinted with permission from AAAS. 
fewer trees than a control group that did not receive payments, and that 
the payments group did not displace tree harvesting onto other nearby 
lands. The difference was large enough that even if these effects were 
completely undone in four years, this delay in cutting down trees would 
be a cost-effective means of decreasing carbon emissions. 
A third advantage is that repeat measurements with satellites are 
extremely cheap. Once analysts develop the methods for measuring 
something once, the satellite keeps orbiting and collecting data, so they, 
and often others, can apply the same algorithm to next month’s or next 
year’s data. 
An excellent example of this is work done on ethnic patronage in 
the Kibera neighborhood of Nairobi, Kenya, by Marx, Stoker, and Suri 
(2019). These three authors are interested in the rents people pay rela-
tive to the quality of their house, but housing quality can vary over time. 
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To get a proxy for that, they measured the reflectance of the metal roofs 
(i.e., the amount of light reflected off the roofs). Roofs get less reflec-
tive as they get rustier (Figure 7.4, left and right lower yellow boxes), 
but when they get replaced, their shiny surfaces reflect more light (left 
and right upper yellow boxes). The authors were able to extract four 
measures of this reflectance for the whole neighborhood over a short 
period of time. Again, they could link the images of each house with a 
survey respondent. 
The authors were able to document and quantify the fact that renters 
pay less rent, and get better housing quality, when they are of the same 
ethnicity as the local political boss. Conversely, they pay more rent and 
get worse housing quality when their landlord is of the same ethnicity 
as the local political boss. 
In addition to reporting data for many points in time, most satel-
lites report data for nearly the whole world on a regular basis. This 
was particularly useful for a study on the effect of subway systems on 
air pollution by Gendron-Carrier et al. (2018). The authors wanted to 
see whether air pollution fell in the weeks and months after subways 
Figure 7.4  Changes in Roof Reflectivity from Old and New Roofs in 
Kibera, Nairobi, Kenya, July 2009 to August 2012 
NOTE: “Both pictures are taken over the same area of the slum with the same resolu-
tion (0.5 meters panchromatic). The picture in the left panel was taken in July 2009 
and that in the right panel in August 2012. The yellow rectangles highlight clusters 
of roofs that markedly evolved over the period. Roofs highlighted in the bottom rect-
angle degraded, while roofs within the top rectangle were upgraded in the same time 
frame” (Marx, Stoker, and Suri 2019, online appendix). 
SOURCE: Marx, Stoker, and Suri (2019). 
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opened, as was the case for Bangalore in 2014 (Figure 7.5). But not 
many cities have seen subways open in the past 20 years. 
Conveniently, satellite data on particulate matter are available for 
the whole world, so Gendron-Carrier et al. (2018) gathered administra-
tive data on the opening of each subway stop in the 42 cities with new 
systems, which they were able to link to the pollution data. Without so 
many cities, they would not have had the statistical power for reliable 
inference. 
Their results are quite striking. They find that subways substantially 
reduce particulates, and that the effect does not tend to decrease for as 
long as they can see in their sample, which is about eight years after 
the opening of the subway. This is somewhat surprising, as much other 
work, from Downs (1962) to Duranton and Turner (2011), predicts that 
new drivers will exploit any reduction in automobile traffic. 
A feature related to the worldwide coverage is that satellites are 
measuring the same quantity everywhere. They don’t turn off or change 
Figure 7.5  Air Pollution before and after Inauguration of a New Subway 
Line in Bangalore 
NOTE: Stations shown as small circles. Darker grid cells represent higher levels of 
particulates, and the large circle has a radius of 10 kilometers, centered on the central 
business district. 
SOURCE: Gendron-Carrier et al. (2018). 
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methods when they cross a national border. This is different from even 
highly standardized surveys such as the Demographic and Health Sur-
veys (DHS) carried out in many countries, because at a minimum, they 
must translate the same questions into different languages. Burgess, 
Costa, and Olken (2018) have exploited this idea of consistency across 
borders to consider the effect of a policy that Brazil introduced in 2006 
to reduce deforestation. There are many reasons why deforestation rates 
change from year to year—including, for example, market prices of 
agricultural products farmers plan to grow on cleared land—so it’s hard 
to distinguish the policy from other phenomena. 
To address this, Burgess, Costa, and Olken (2018) use a spatial 
regression discontinuity design, as illustrated in Figure 7.6. Each point 
in each graph represents the share of forest in a 2.5-kilometer-wide 
swath of land parallel to Brazil’s border cut down in a given year. This 
is equivalent to measuring deforestation along a transect crossing the 
border and then aggregating appropriately across all such transects. In 
the early years in the top row (2001–2005), when one moves from left 
to right into Brazil, rates of deforestation increase dramatically pre-
Figure 7.6  Deforestation Rates by Year and Distance to the Brazilian 
Border 
NOTE: Average forest cover lost as a function of distance to the Brazilian border by 
year. Each point represents a 2.5-kilometer-wide band, indexed by distance into Brazil 
from the border, where negative values are in a neighboring country. 
SOURCE: Burgess, Costa, and Olken (2018). 
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cisely at the border, represented by the vertical line in the middle. How-
ever, starting in 2006, that differential falls considerably, and by 2009 it 
is barely detectable. This is striking evidence that something important 
changed in Brazil relative to its neighbors in 2006, and the authors posit 
that this policy is the most likely candidate. Note that with coarser data, 
say at the district level, it would be more difficult to determine whether 
the jump happened precisely at the border. 
The last advantage of satellites that I will highlight is their indepen-
dence from typical reporting mechanisms. This is especially important 
when local officials might have incentives to underreport environmen-
tal damage, for example, but it has broader implications. 
In an earlier paper, Burgess et al. (2012) look at how deforestation 
changed during rapid redistricting in Indonesia in the 2000s (Figure 
7.7). By exploiting quirks in the timing of these changes, they show that 
redistricting led to more rapid deforestation. Their results are consistent 
with a model of Cournot competition in which the redistricting increased 
competition between districts for the revenue from legal and illegal log-
ging.2 A similar strategy has been used to investigate pollution in China, 
where the accuracy of official reporting has been called into question, 
with mixed results (Chen et al. 2012, 2013; Bombardini and Li 2019). 
Even in the absence of outright falsification, the availability of a 
measure independent of traditional data sources is useful to reduce 
measurement error. Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2012) show this 
in combining data on lights growth with traditional GDP growth data. 
In essence, both lights and traditional GDP are subject to measurement 
error, but since the sources of their measurement error are very differ-
ent, they are likely to be uncorrelated, and thus the two measures can 
be combined to form better estimates.3 Pinkovskiy and Sala-i-Martin 
(2016) invoke a similar method in using lights to determine whether 
national accounts or household survey data provide more reliable esti-
mates of national incomes. 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
To highlight these six advantages of spatial data, I have described 
examples related to deforestation, pollution, urban growth, transporta-
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Figure 7.7  Forest Cover in Riau Province, Indonesia, 2001–2008 
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SOURCE: Burgess et al. (2012), by permission of Oxford University Press. 
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tion, and political economy. There are many more in economics, on top-
ics as varied as tourism (Faber and Gaubert 2019) and economic history 
(Pascali 2017), not to mention a much longer tradition in other fields, 
especially environmental science. 
Another area that holds particular promise for the future is agricul-
ture, especially in the developing world. It is not easy to learn a lot about 
crop choice or yield from a single satellite image. But once multiple 
images per growing season are available—or, even better, images every 
day—it starts becoming possible to learn an enormous amount about 
the agricultural economy. And with higher frequency high-resolution
images, I expect that we will be able to learn about the choices of indi-
vidual farmers at increasingly low cost.4 
While I believe that this technology holds great promise, I do not 
want to give the impression that it can replace traditional data sources, 
or that it is without problems. The view from above is a powerful one, 
but it is not a complete one, and traditional administrative or survey data 
are critical to have in nearly all of the examples described above. Any 
given satellite image is a snapshot at one instant in time, not a summary 
of a day or a month that one could get, for example, from a pollution 
monitoring station. The most recent night-lights sensors,5 for another 
example, provide data from two o’clock in the morning—as opposed to 
the early evening, as earlier satellites did—and so researchers will have 
to study whether that changes their relationship with economic activity. 
Satellites do not last forever, so repeat measurements over long periods 
require launching new satellites and adapting measurement techniques 
to them. It is still difficult to delineate objects like building footprints 
from a satellite image. Computers are getting better at that, but it’s not 
yet routine, so it often requires lots of human labor. And while it is true 
that satellites generally operate the same way regardless of their loca-
tion, context still matters. For example, an algorithm that is good at 
distinguishing a city from a surrounding forest does not always work 
as well in distinguishing a city from a surrounding desert. So, as in 
everything, it is important to know one’s data well before attempting 
to interpret it. 
To briefly summarize, satellites provide data for data-poor con-
texts, often at high resolution, with frequent repeat measurement, for 
the whole world, consistently across borders, in a way that is difficult 
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providers. They are not magic, but as the price of data and processing 
power goes down and algorithms for analyzing them get better, they 
hold enormous potential for learning about economics and policy. 
Notes 
This chapter is based on the opening keynote address of the World Bank Land and 
Poverty Conference 2019, drawing on material from the Sichel Lecture delivered at 
Western Michigan University on October 10, 2018, and on Donaldson and Storeygard 
(2016). As Donaldson and Storeygard make clear, the economics literature using satel-
lite data relies heavily on a much larger and older (but still rapidly developing) technical 
literature on the engineering and science of remote sensing. 
1. For more details on satellite data and their use in economics, see Donaldson and 
Storeygard (2016), especially the references therein. 
2. Note that redistricting could cause more mundane difficulties in reporting as 
well, as new district governments come into being, even in the absence of illegal 
motives. 
3. This is slightly complicated by the fact that the units of the lights-based estimate 
are unknown. By analogy, if one weighs oneself with two different scales, both 
using kilograms as their unit of account, a simple mean of the two measurements 
is the optimal combination (unless one knows something about their relative pre-
cision). However, if one of the scales has an unknown unit of account, then its 
relationship to kilograms must be measured using the same data. 
4. See Lobell (2013) and, for a recent developing-world example, Burke and Lobell 
(2017). 
5. Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS). 
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